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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT M. MCRAE, 
Applicant/ Appellant, 
MCRAE AND DELAND and/or WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Court of Appeals: 
#87-0431-CA 
Industrial Commission: 
#85000739 
Administrative Law Judge; 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Priority: #6 
APPEAL 
JURISDICTION 
This is an action for review and determination of the 
lawfulness of a denial of an award by the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction by virtue of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 35-1-86. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's 
Order denying compensation benefits to Mr. Robert McRae. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the Utah Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in denying worker's compensation benefits to Mr. 
McRae by deciding Plaint iff/Appellant's heart attack was not a 
result of injury by accident as defined in U.C.A. 35-1-45, and 
interpretive case law. 
2. Whether the Utah Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in denying Plaint iff/Appellant worker's 
compensation benefits when there was significant competent medical 
evidence that his heart attack was unrelated to his work 
act ivities. 
3. Whether the Utah Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in not referring the matter to a medical panel. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Statutes, cases and authorities believed to be determinative 
of the respective issues include the following: 
1. Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
2. Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
3. Section 35-1-86, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
4- Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) 
5. Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, 736 P.2d 237 
(Utah 1987) 
The statutes and cases mentioned herein are attached hereto 
in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves Mr. Robert McRae's claim for worker's 
compensation benefits for an injury which he alleges he sustained 
by an accident arising out of or in the course of his employment 
on or about June 28, 1985. 
B. Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition by Industrial Commission 
On January 16, 1987, a hearing was held on this matter before 
the Industrial Commission. On June 22, 1987, Judge Richard 
Sumsion entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
denying Applicant's claim for compensation benefits. (R.390) On 
2 
August 10, 1987, Appellant filed a Motion For Review. (R.399) On 
September 9, 1987, the Industrial Commission upheld the 
Administrative Law Judge by its Order denying Motion for Review. 
(R.434) 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On June 28, 1985, the Appellant, Mr. Robert McRae was 
employed as an attorney with the law firm of McRae and Deland in 
Vernal, Utah. (R.36-37) 
2. On June 28, 1985, Mr. McRae experienced pain in his 
stomach area and sought medical attention at Ashley Valley Medical 
Center. (H.41) 
3. After seeking medical attention, Mr. McRae went to an 
oil field to see a client. (R.42) 
4. On June 29, 1985 at about 9:00 a.m., Mr. McRae again 
went to Ashley Valley Medical Center to seek follow-up treatment 
for the pain he was experiencing the day before. (R.43) 
5. On June 29, 1985, after an EKG and blood test at Ashley 
Valley Medical Center, Mr. McRae returned to his office to take a 
routine deposition. (R.44, 218) 
6. At about 11:00 a.m. on June 29, 1985, Mr. McRae received 
a telephone call from Dr. Norman Nielsen, who informed McRae that 
he should "[g]et to the hospital,...[because he was] having a 
heart attack." (R.47) 
7. On June 29, 1985, McRae was transported by airplane from 
Vernal, Utah to Salt Lake City, and admitted to St. Mark's 
Hospital. (R.48-49) 
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8. On June 30, 1985, at St. Mark's Hospital, triple by-pass 
heart surgery was performed on Mr- McRae. (R.275) 
9. Since 1980, Mr. McRae has been taking medication for 
high blood pressure. (R.62) 
10. In 1970, Mr. McRae was admitted to Holy Cross Hospital 
for chest pains. (R. 75, 377) 
11. In September of 1974, Mr. McRae was admitted to the 
University of Colorado Medical Center for chest pains. (R.77) 
12. In March of 1982, McRae was admitted to the Ashley 
Valley Medical Center for treatment for a Valium overdose. 
(R. 97, 309) 
13. Before June of 1985, McRae had a 30 year history of 
smoking two packs of cigarettes a day. (R.78) 
14. Prior to June of 1985, Mr. McRae was an alcoholic and 
had been for many years. (R.217) He had been using alcohol for 
over 33 years, since he was 16 years old. (R.80) 
15. In May of 1984, McRae had cancer surgery performed on 
his penis with loss of the distal portion. (R.94, 275) 
16. McRae, prior to June of 1985 had experienced stress over 
the subdivision of some real property which he owned. (R.94, 275) 
17. McRae, prior to June of 1985 had a confrontation with 
his wife concerning his marriage, when his wife found out about an 
extramarital affair he had. (R.94, 275) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
provides that an employee "who is injured...by accident arising 
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out of or in the course of his employment,...shal1 be paid 
compensation." The Utah case of Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) sets forth that in order for such an 
accident to be compensable, the claimant must show that the 
employment was both the legal cause and the medical cause of the 
injury. 
Because the claimant had a preexisting condition in the form 
of a heart condition, to show legal causation the claimant must 
prove that he put forth unusual or extraordinary exertion which 
substantially increased the risk he already faced in everyday 
life. Because claimant - McRae, did not put forth extraordinary 
exertion which substantially increased the risk he already faced, 
legal causation is lacking and therefore the injury is not 
compensable. 
Further, with regard to the medical causation issue, because 
there is no competent and uncontradicted medical evidence 
supporting a finding of a medically demonstrable causal link 
between any work related exertion and the injury, the 
Administrative Law Judge did not act arbitrarily and capriciously 
in concluding that medical causation was lacking. 
Accordingly, because neither legal causation nor medical 
causation exists in this case, the injury is noncompensable and 
the Industrial Commission's Order denying benefits should be 
upheld. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE "ALLEN TEST," BECAUSE THE 
APPLICANT HAD A PRE-EXISTING CONDITION WHICH CONTRIBUTED 
TO HIS INJURY, AND HE DID NOT PUT FORTH UNUSUAL OR 
EXTRAORDINARY EXERTION, APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT WAS NOT 
THE LEGAL CAUSE OF HIS INJURY, AND THEREFORE THE 
ACCIDENT IS NOT COMPENSABLE. 
Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
provides that an employee "who is injured...by accident arising 
out of or in the course of his employment, ...shall be paid 
compensation..." While the Workers' Compensation Act does not 
define this phrase, the recent case of Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) sets forth the procedure to be 
utilized in analyzing accident cases involving internal failures. 
^
n
 Allen, the sole issue on appeal was whether the claimant who 
had suffered pre-existing back problems and was injured as the 
result of exertion usual and typical for his job, was injured "by 
accident arising out of or in the course of employment." In 
addressing this issue, the Utah Supreme Court set forth the 
standards as follows: 
This statute creates two prerequisites for a finding of 
a compensable injury. First, the injury must be "by 
accident." Second, the language "arising out of or in 
the course of employment" requires that there be a 
causal connection between the injury and the employment. 
See Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 
1367, 1370 (Utah 1983). 
* * * 
The language "arising out of or in the course of his 
employment" found in U.C.A., 1953, Section 35-1-45 
(Supp. 1986), was apparently intended to ensure that 
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compensation is only awarded where there is a sufficient 
causal connection between the disability and the working 
conditions. The causation requirement makes it 
necessary to distinguish those injuries which (a) 
coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting 
condition results in symptoms which appear during work 
hours without any enhancement from the work place, and 
(b) those injuries which occur because some condition or 
exertion required by the employment increases the risk 
of injury which the worker normally faces in his 
everyday life. See Bryant v. Masters Machine Co., 44 
A.2d 329, 337 (Me. 1982). Only the latter type of injury 
is compensable under U.C.A., 1953, Section 35-1-45. 
There is no fixed formula by which the causation issue 
may be resolved, and the issue must be determined on the 
facts of each case. 
Professor Larson has suggested a two-part causation test 
which is consistent with the purpose of our workers' 
compensation laws and helpful in determining causation. 
We therefore adopt that test. Larson suggests that 
compensable injuries can best be identified by first 
considering the legal cause of the injury and then its 
medical cause. Larson, supra Section 38.83 (a), at 7-
273. "Under the legal test, the law must define what 
kind of exertion satisfies the test of 'arising out of 
the employment'...[then] the doctors must say whether 
the exertion (having been held legally sufficient to 
support compensation) in fact caused this [injury]." 
Larson supra Section 38.83 (a), at -276 to -277. 
1. Legal Cause - Whether an injury arose out of or in 
the course of employment is difficult to determine where 
the employee brings to the work place a personal element 
of risk such as preexisting condition. 
To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with 
a preexisting condition must show that the employment 
contributed something substantial to increase the risk 
he already faced in everyday life because of his 
condition. This additional element of risk in the work 
place is usually supplied by an exertion greater than 
that undertaken in normal, everyday life. This extra 
exertion serves to offset the preexisting condition of 
the employee as a likely cause of the injury thereby 
eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a 
personal risk rather than exertions at work. Larson, 
supra, Section 38.83 (b), at 2-278. Larson summarized 
how the legal cause rule would work in practice as 
follows: 
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If there is some personal causal contribution 
in the form of a [preexisting condition], the 
employment contribution must take the form of 
an exertion greater than that of 
nonemployment life... 
If there is no personal causal contribution, 
that is, if there is no prior weakness or 
disease, any exertion connected with the 
employment and causally connected with the 
[injury] as a matter of medical fact is 
adequate to satisfy the legal test of 
causation. 
Id. Thus, where the claimant suffers from a 
preexisting condition which contributes to the 
injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion 
is required to prove legal causation. Where 
there is no preexisting condition, a usual or 
ordinary exertion is sufficient. 
729 P.2d at 18, 24-26 
Accordingly, Allen stands for the proposition that both legal 
and medical causation must be established before an injury in the 
course of employment is compensable. Moreover, to meet the legal 
causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting condition 
must show that the employment contributed something substantial to 
increase the risk he already faced in everyday life. Further, an 
unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to help prove that 
the employment did in fact contribute substantially to the injury. 
It is Respondent-Workers * Compensation Fund of Utah's 
contention that the legal causation requirement as set forth in 
Allen has not been met, and therefore the injury which Mr. McRae 
sustained was not an accident "arising out of or in the course of 
his employment,,f and therefore, it is a non-compensable accident. 
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More specifically, inasmuch as Mr. McRae came to the 
workplace with a pre-existing condition (heart disease), before 
legal causation can be established, there must be a finding that 
the employment activities of Mr. McRae contributed something 
substantial to increase the risk he already faced. That is, in 
order to prove that Mr. McRae's employment was the legal cause of 
his injury, it is necessary that he show that his employment 
activities involved an unusual or extraordinary exertion greater 
than that of nonemployment life. This, appellant has failed to so 
prove• 
At page 32 of Appellant's brief it is conceded that Mr. McRae 
had a preexisting heart condition. ("Since we have admitted that 
McRae had a preexisting heart condition, two more tests apply.") 
Because of the existence of the preexisting heart condition, for 
Mr. McRae's injury to be compensable, it is incumbent that he 
prove that an unusual or extraordinary exertion was put forth 
which substantially increased the risk he already faced in 
everyday life. (Emphasis added) 
Appellant claims that certain stressful conditions existed 
immediately prior to incurring his injury on June 28 and/or June 
29, 1985, and that the stressful conditions were tantamount to 
unusual or extraordinary exertion so as to support a finding of 
legal causation and therefore compensability* 
Specifically, Appellant claims that "A stressful deposition 
on Saturday [June 29, 1985] was unusually stressful and unique, 
not only because it was a crucial deposition, but also because 
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McRae did not ordinarily work on Saturday. ...Claimants work load 
was so heavy during the last week that he had to schedule a 
stressful deposition on Saturday." (R.33-34) 
Respondents take exception to this statement and maintain 
that the deposition referred to was not as stressful as Appellant 
might lead the Court to believe. A closer examination of the 
record supports Respondents position. The deposition taken on the 
Saturday referred to was "a clear liability case, with a target 
defendant." (R.45) Further, Dr. McCann's records indicate, "The 
patient described the taking of routine depositions." (R.218) 
Moreover, McRae did not spend an inordinate amount of time 
preparing for the deposition on the 29th of June. "I met with the 
client at 9:30 to tell him - spent a half an hour with him ... and 
explained to him what a deposition is and how to respond to 
question, and the usual things that - I guess all of us in this 
room would understand..." (R.46) 
Appellant further maintains that the stress McRae was under 
was tantamount to unusual exertion because "he was also working on 
a very important divorce case with high financial stakes." 
(Appellants Brief, page 13) Here, appellant, citing R.45-46 is 
reading something into the record which clearly does not exist. 
What the record accurately reflects is as follows: 
Q. How about assignments that are made in the 
office? 
A. [McRae] When it's — When it's going-to-court times on 
routine D.U.I.'s and divorces and those types 
of thing -- which divorces I don't take --
Q. Uh-huh. 
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A. -- personally — then it's whoever's — I'm 
the last of the colleagues of my cases, to put 
it bluntly- (H.46) 
The foregoing excerpt from the record shows that Appellant 
has blatantly misstated the record. There is no indication that 
McRae even handled a divorce case during the week - or month-
preceding his injury, let alone "a very important divorce case 
with high financial stakes." 
Accordingly, it is at best, very questionable whether 
Appellant's work activities during the time frame immediately 
preceding his injury arose to a level which may be characterized 
as unusual or extraordinary in terms of the amount of exertion put 
forth. 
Respondent firmly maintains that the facts in this case 
clearly indicate that any mental stress which McRae was under did 
not amount to unusual exertion. Moreover, any stress experienced 
by McRae because of his job-related activities, certainly did not 
rise to the level of being a substantial factor in causing his 
injury. 
It is Respondent's position that Mr. McRae's schedule and 
activities as an attorney were no more mentally stressful than the 
average person's non-employment mental stresses of, for example, 
social confrontations, financial problems, general health concerns 
and/or the stresses of raising children. 
While it may be somewhat difficult to objectively weigh one 
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mental stress against another, resorting back to the language of 
Allen is helpful in resolving the dilemma. 
To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with 
a preexisting condition must show that the employment 
contributed something substantial to increase the risk 
he already faced in everyday life because of his 
condition. This additional element of risk in the 
workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater 
than that undertaken in normal, everyday life. This 
extra exertion serves to offset the preexisting 
condition of the employee as a likely cause of the 
injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairments 
resulting from a personal risk rather than exertions at 
work. 
729 P.2d at 25 
The key language here is "contributed something substantial" 
to the risk already faced. If the work activities do not 
contribute something substantial, then legal causation is wanting 
and the injury is not compensable. Thus, the question becomes, 
did McRae's work related stress contribute substantially to 
increasing the risk of heart failure that he already faced due to 
his preexisting condition. Inasmuch as in internal failure cases, 
the legal causation issue is closely intertwined with the medical 
causation issue, this question may be answered by referring to the 
various doctors' reports which are in the record. 
Dr. J. Joseph Perry, M.D., after examining Mr. McRae and 
reviewing his prior medical records, responded to certain 
questions put forth to him as follows: 
1. Is it probable that the stress of Mr. McRae's job caused 
or contributed to his myocardial infarction, June 28, 
1985? 
[Dr. Perry's Response] There was no change in his job 
requirements, the physical activity, number of hours 
worked, or stresses in the months prior to his 
12 
myocardial infarction, compared to the years before this 
occurred. Therefore, there is no causal relationship of 
an acute nature with his myocardial infarction. The 
question of chronic job stress is a different issue. I 
think that there was a much greater contribution to his 
premature coronary atherosclerosis from his heavy 
cigarette smoking, his high cholesterolemia, and his 
facial xanthoma, as well as his type - A personality 
than one could attribute to his job as an attorney. 
(R.226) 
Dr. David L. McCann, M.D. evaluated Mr. McRae's condition and 
set forth as follows: 
2. Based on your examination and evaluation, would Mr. 
McRae's personality type be more susceptible to stress 
related diseases? 
[Dr. McCann's Response] Alcoholics are more susceptible 
to a wide variety of diseases including heart 
disease. 
3. Could his personality type, given the nature 
of his work, have contributed to his heart 
attack on June 28, 1985? 
[Dr. McCann's Response] The patient's alcoholism could 
have contributed to his heart attack by way 
of alteration of blood lipids and increased 
risk of arteriosclerosis. 
7. If possible, could you give your expert 
opinion as to whether or not Mr. McRae was 
under any excessive or abnormal stress prior 
to the time of his myocardial infarction? 
[Dr. McCann's Response] The patient described the taking 
of routine depositions. The primary stress he 
appeared to be under was from making bad 
financial decisions and having to work 
excessively to compensate for them. (R.218) 
In light of Dr. Perry's report, it is readily apparent that 
there are a number of risk factors - other than job related stress 
- which were very substantial in causing Mr. McRae's myocardial 
infarction. From a purely logical standpoint, where there are 
five major risk factors present (cigarette smoking, high 
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cholesterolemia, facial xanthoma, type - A personality, 
alcoholism), even in the absence of the work stress factor, it 
would seem that adding one more factor is not a substantial 
contribution to the risk he already faced. Consequently, because 
the work related stress was not a substantial factor in causing 
the infarction, pursuant to Allen, the injury is not compensable. 
In addition to the risk factors enumerated by Dr. Perry, 
Respondent is of the belief that there existed a number of other 
non work-related stresses which may very well have been 
responsible for bringing about injury to Mr. McRae. Specifically, 
as early as 1980 Mr. McRae was diagnosed as having high blood 
pressure and was taking medication for the same. (R.62) In 
addition thereto, the record indicates that Mr. McRae may have 
been experiencing great stress in other aspects of his life. A 
Discharge Summary from St. Mark's Hospital, dated July 16, 1985, 
sets forth the following: 
He has been under some stress lately. In May of 1984, 
he had cancer surgery on his penis with loss of the 
distal portion of the penis...But there is stress in a 
real state of division he has been working on.1 There 
is a partner defaulting on the situation there and his 
wife had recently found out about a recent affair and 
there is some conflict in their marriage over that. His 
wife reports that he has always talked about suicide. 
Four years ago he had a Valium and alcohol 
overdose...(R.275) 
It is Respondent's position that these additional 
circumstances - separate and apart from any work related stresses 
1
 The record, at R. 94 and 95 indicates that this involved 
stress over an investment in real estate; Specifically, the 
subdivision of a farm owned by McRae. 
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- very probably were more stressful than the stresses of McRae's 
workplace. That is to say, the stresses of everyday life which 
McRae faced (financial stress, health stress, social stress) were 
greater than the stresses of being an attorney. Moreover, these 
additional stresses which McRae encountered are stresses faced in 
everyday life in the 20th Century. Accordingly, the 
exertion/stress associated with the workplace was not 
extraordinary or unusual, and as such, cannot be considered a 
legal cause of McRae's injury. 
Thus, McRae's employment did not contribute anything 
substant ial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday 
life. Rather, the myocardial infarction coincidentally occurred 
during work hours without any enhancement from the workplace. 
Wherefore, because McRae's injury was not legally caused by his 
employment, the "accident" herein did not "arise out of or in the 
course of employment," and is therefore not compensable. 
At this juncture, Respondent sees it fitting to distinguish 
some of the cases cited by Appellant. Appellant cites Nuzum v. 
Rossendahl Construction and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 
1977) as standing for the proposition that "ONLY SLIGHT PHYSICAL 
EXERTION IS REQUIRED." After discussing the facts of Nuzum, 
appellant states, and adds emphasis "Merely climbing in and out of 
the cab Tof the truck] was found to be sufficient exertion to 
recover benefits." (Appellant's Brief at page 18) 
Appellants reliance on Nuzum is misplaced. First, the later 
Allen case reinterpreted the standards that had been applied by 
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the Nuzum Court, thereby creating a significantly different burden 
on an applicant with a preexisting condition. Further, while it 
is true that the Court held that the employees death resulted from 
an accidental occurrence that arose out of and in the course of 
employment, by the facts the Nuzum case was not out of line with 
Allen. The Applicant in Nuzum sustained injury not by "merely 
climbing in and out of the cab," but rather, by "repeatedly 
hoisting himself up these abnormally long steps into the cab and 
was thus put to a greater exertion than normally would have been 
required. ..and that this placed such stress on his already 
weakened heart that it could not cope with the burden." Nuzum at 
1146. That is, Nuzum was concerned with an employee who had a 
preexisting heart condition and because he was injured while 
putting forth an unusual exertion, his injury arose "out of or in 
the course of employment." 
Appellant also relies heavily upon the 1949 case of Purity 
Biscuit Company v. Industrial Commission, 201 P.2d 961 (Utah 1949) 
as standing for the proposition that "ONLY USUAL EXERTION IS 
REQUIRED" (Appellants Brief at page 18). This statement of 
Appellant's needs to be clarified. A proper statement would read 
as follows: "Only usual exertion is required so long as the 
exertion is the cause of the injury.11 In Purity Biscuit Co., the 
Utah Supreme Court set forth: 
We again wish to make it clear that we do not intend to 
dispense with that requirement that in a case of this 
kind where the employee suffers an internal bodily 
failure or breakdown the burden is on the applicant to 
show that the exertion was at least a contributing cause 
thereof. In other words, we are not abandoning the 
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requirement that in cases where disease or internal 
failure causes or is the injury there must be a causal 
connection between the employment and the injury. 
201 P.2d at 961 
Again, the Purity case cited by Appellant is not inconsistent 
with Allen- Rather, Allen acted to clarify the inconsistent case 
law which had been handed down since Purity.2 Accordingly, when 
an internal failure is the injury, as in the case at bar, a causal 
connection between the employment and injury must be established 
if an applicant is to be compensated. Allen set forth the 
standards to be utilized in determining the causation issue. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING 
THAT THE STRESS OR EXERTION REQUIRED BY MR. MCRAE'S JOB 
WAS THE MEDICAL CAUSE OF HIS INJURY, AND THEREFORE, 
PURSUANT TO THE "ALLEN TEST" THE ACCIDENT IS NOT 
COMPENSABLE. 
As with the issue concerning legal causation, Allen is the 
appropriate place to commence a discussion concerning medical 
causation. The Utah Supreme Court set forth the following: 
[10] 2. Medical Cause - The second part of Larson's 
dual-causation test requires that the claimant prove the 
disability is medically the result of an exertion or 
2
 "When read in chronological sequence, our opinions 
demonstrate an inconsistent and confused approach to determining 
when an accident arose out of or in the course of 
employment.... [W]e take this opportunity to examine an alternative 
causation analysis that may better meet the objectives of the 
workers' compensation laws. We are mindful that the key question 
in determining causation is whether, given this body and this 
exertion, the exertion in fact contributed to the injury. Id. 
Section 38.82 at 7-271; Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 23, 201 P.2d 
at 972 (Wolfe, J., concurring specially). 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 24 
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injury that occurred during a work-related* activity. 
The purpose of the medical cause test is to ensure that 
there is a medically demonstrable causal link between 
the work-related exertions and the unexpected injuries 
that resulted from those strains. The medical causal 
requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a 
general insurer of his employees and discourage 
fraudulent claims. 
* * * 
Under the medical cause test, the claimant must show by 
evidence, opinion, or otherwise that the stress, strain, 
or exertion required by his or her occupation led to the 
resulting injury or disability. In the event the 
claimant cannot show a medical causal connection, 
compensation should be denied. 
729 P.2d at 27 
Thus, in accordance with Allen, in order for an accident to 
be compensable, it must be determined that the injury was 
medically caused by the stress, strain, or exertion required by 
one's employment. 
In the proceedings below, the Industrial Commission did not 
reach the issue of medical causation because it conclusively found 
that legal causation was wanting and therefore the issue of 
medical causation was rendered moot. However, inasmuch as the 
issues of legal causation and medical causation appear to be 
closely intertwined in internal failure cases, and inasmuch as 
Appellant herein briefly makes mention of the medical findings of 
this case, Respondent will briefly address the issue of medical 
causation. 
The medical causation standard espoused in Allen was followed 
and discussed in the context of a heart attack case in Lancaster 
v. Gilbert Development, 736 P.2d 237 (Utah 1987). 
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As in Lancaster, in the case at hand there is not competent 
and uncontradicted testimony indicating with medical certainty 
that there existed a medical causal link between the alleged 
industrial events and Mr. McRae's infarction. 
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In my opinion, the emotional stress and tension related 
to his occupation are certainly associated with an 
aggravation to produce his myocardial infarction. 
(Appellant's Brief at page 20 and 21; R.228) 
On the other hand, as set forth earlier in this brief, Dr. 
Perry made the following statement concerning Mr. McRae: 
The question of chronic job stress is a different issue. 
I think that there was a much greater contribution to 
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his premature coronary artherosclerosis from his heavy 
cigarette smoking, his high cholesterolemia, and his 
facial xanthoma, as well as his type-A hard driving 
personality than one could attribute to his job as an 
attorney. (R.226) 
As can be seen from the statements of the respective doctors, 
the two views are not completely compatible. Accordingly, as in 
Lancaster, the evidence of any connection between work related 
stress and the injury is inconclusive. Thus, in light of Dr. 
Perry's statement, there is competent medical evidence in the 
record upon which the Administrative Law Judge could rely in 
concluding that medical causation was lacking. That is precisely 
what the Administrative Law Judge did - rely upon Dr. Perry's 
opinions. 
But, as applied to the facts of the instant case, the 
Administrative Law Judge finds the analysis and opinion 
of Dr. Perry more accurately reflects the causative 
factors leading to the applicant's hospitalization and 
bypass surgery and the Administrative Law Judge adopts 
Dr. Perry's opinion as his own. In doing so, it should 
be noted that in analyzing the causative factors 
leading to heart problems, the risk factors are 
generally well known. Isolating which of those risk 
factors constitutes the actual cause appears to be an 
almost impossible task, but a consideration of the 
factors does allow for a considered opinion relative to 
the medical probabilities. The significance of this is 
emphasized by the Supreme Court's recent decision in the 
case of Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, filed April 
20, 1987. (R.394) 
Thus, in accordance with Lancaster, although the medical 
evidence was conflicting, it is the responsibility and prerogative 
of the Administrative Law Judge to resolve factual conflicts, and 
therefore no error was committed in adopting Dr. Perry's opinion. 
Further, Respondent feels compelled to address certain other 
statements made by Appellant with regard to the medical causation 
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issue. Appellant argues that because Dr. Perry was not the 
treating physician, "[C]ertainly such a report should not be given 
equal standing with the report of the treating physician, but if 
it is given any credence, it should be a basis for submission of 
the questions of aggravation and causation to a medical panel." 
(Appellant's Brief on page 22) 
This statement by Appellant is in complete opposition to the 
rule of law as set forth in Lancaster. That is, appellant 
maintains that in any case involving conflicting medical opinions, 
the treating physician's opinion should be given more credence 
than that of any other physician who has reviewed the records and 
set forth a calculated opinion. Lancaster clearly states 
otherwise. The Commission is to give what weight it deems 
appropriate to competent admissible evidence according to the 
circumstances of the case. 
POINT III 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY AND 
CAPRICIOUSLY IN NOT REFERRING THE MATTER TO A MEDICAL 
PANEL; NOR DID HE ACT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN 
FINDING THAT MCRAE'S INJURY IS NOT COMPENSABLE. 
Appellant maintains that the Administrative Law Judge acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously by not referring the matter to a 
medical panel. Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended) sets forth that the commission may refer the medical 
aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission. The language of this statute clearly indicates that 
this is a discretionary function and therefore referral to a 
medical panel is not mandatory. Moreover, in light of Lancaster, 
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because there was competent medical evidence in the record, the 
Administrative Law Judge acted properly in relying upon the 
medical evidence that best addressed the question of how 
substantial the work contribution was in causing the injury. That 
is, while the aforementioned statements of Dr. Perry and Dr. Null 
addressed the same issues generally, Dr. Perry's statement looked 
to quantifying how substantial the work stress factor was in 
comparison to the preexisting factors. Dr. Null's did not. 
Further, Dr. Null's opinion - while not completely compatible with 
the opinion of Dr. Perry - is not completely at odds with that of 
Dr. Perry. Dr. Perry merely elaborated more definitively in his 
analysis. As such, it was not mandatory that a medical panel be 
appointed to resolve a medical controversy as no true controversy 
was evident. 
POINT IV 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION DENYING 
COMPENSATION TO MR. MCRAE WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR 
CAPRICIOUS, WHOLLY WITHOUT CAUSE, OR WITHOUT ANY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT; AND THEREFORE THE 
ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MAY NOT BE 
OVERTURNED. 
The standard of review which has been utilized by the Court 
in Industrial Commission cases is stringent and there are numerous 
cases which have articulated the power or scope of review which 
the reviewing court possesses with regard to decisions handed down 
by the Industrial Commission. 
One such case which clearly sets forth the proper standard is 
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Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). 
In Kaiser the Court stated: 
Under any of these standards . . . it is apparent that 
this Court's function in reviewing Commission findings 
of fact is a strictly limited one in which the question 
is not whether the Court agrees with the Commission's 
findings or whether they are supported by the 
preponderance of evidence. Instead, the reviewing 
court's inquiry is whether the Commission's findings 
are "arbitrary or capricious," or "wholly without cause" 
or contrary to the "one [inevitable] conclusion from the 
evidence" to support them. Only then should the 
Commissions findings be displaced. 631 P.2d at 890. 
Another case which addressed the issue of this Court's scope 
of review is Martinson v. W.M. Insurance Agency, Inc., 606 P.2d 
256 (Utah 1980): 
When the Commission remains unpersuaded on a question of 
fact, this Court does not disagree therewith and compel 
such a finding unless the evidence is such that all 
reasonable minds would so find, and the court would thus 
so rule as a matter of law. On the contrary, if there 
is a reasonable basis in the evidence (or lack of 
evidence) such that reasonable minds acting fairly 
thereon could remain unpersuaded, this Court does not 
upset the determination made. 
606 P.2d at 258, 259. 
See also the very recent case of Hodges v. Western Piling and 
Sheeting Company, 717 P.2d 718, 720 (Utah 1986) wherein this Court 
stated, "In reviewing questions of fact, this Court gives great 
deference to the Commission's findings. Only where the findings 
are without foundation in the evidence will the court reverse." 
Accordingly, applying the above-cited authority to the case 
at bar, the Appellate Court is powerless to overturn the 
Industrial Commission's order unless it can be said that based 
upon the entire record, the Industrial Commission clearly acted 
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arbitrarily and capriciously in holding that the injury was not 
compensable• 
An examination of the record makes it clear that the 
Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in determining 
that Mr. McRae's work related stress caused his injury. 
Therefore, the order must stand. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission-based on credible, competent 
evidence-decided as a matter of fact that McRae's heart attack was 
not the result of his work activities. Thus, he did not suffer a 
compensable industrial accident. In reaching its conclusion, the 
Industrial Commission applied the appropriate legal standard as 
set forth in Allen. 
Therefore, the Utah Court of Appeals should uphold the 
Industrial Commission's ruling denying compensation. 
DATED this fo^day of April, 1988. 
James /R. Black 
Kfvip M. McDonough 
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35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured, and the de-
pendents of every such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of or in 
the course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident 
was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained 
on account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and 
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral 
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insur-
ance carrier and not on the employee. 
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35-1-77. Medical panel — Discretionary authority of com-
mission to refer case — Findings and reports — 
Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses. 
Upon the filing of a claim for compel*potion for injury by accident, or for 
death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and where the employer 
or insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the medical 
aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the commission and having 
the qualifications generally applicable to the medical panel set forth in sec-
tion 35-2-56. The medical panel shall then make such study, take such X-rays 
and perform such tests, including post-mortem examinations where autho-
rized by the commission, as it may determine and thereafter make a report in 
writing to, the commission in a form prescribed by the commission, and«also-
make such additional findings as the commission may require. The commis-
sion shall promptly distribute full copies of the report of the panel to the 
applicant, the employer and the insurance carrier by registered mail with 
return receipt requested. Within fifteen days after such report is deposited in 
the United States post office, the applicant, the employer or the insurance 
carrier may file with the commission objections in writing thereto. If no objec-
tions are so filed within such period, the report shall be deemed admitted in 
evidence and the commission may base its finding and decision on the report 
of the panel, but shall not be bound by such report if there is other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case which supports a contrary finding by the 
commission. If objections to such report are filed the commission may set the 
case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved, .and at such hear-
ing any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of 
the medical panel present at the hearing for examination and cross-examina-
tion. For good cause shown the commission may order other members of the 
panel, with or without the chairman, to be present at the hearing for exami-
nation and cross-examination. Upon such hearing the written report of the 
panel may be received as an exhibit but shall not be considered as evidence in 
the case except as far as it is sustained by the testimony admitted. The ex-
penses of such study and report by the medical panel and of their appearance 
before the commission shall be paid out of the fund provided for by section 
35-1-63. 
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35-1-86. Court of Appeals may review commission's ac-
tions [Effective January 1, 1988]. 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul any 
award of the commission, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution of 
any award. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER _ .- "\ 
Sta* 
, ^ e fund 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 16, 
1987, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
Richard G. Sums ion, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by Keith E. 
Sohm, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Elliot K. Morris, 
Attorney at Law. 
The issues in this case are as follows: 
1. Was the stress of the applicant's employment as an 
attorney on June 28-29, 1985, the cause of the heart 
attack sustained at that time? 
2. Does the stress to which the applicant was subjected 
on or before June 28, 1985, fulfill the r acquirements 
of legal causation and medical causation as defined in 
the recent case of Allen v. Industrial Commission? 
3. If so, what benefits is the applicant entitled to 
under the Workers Compensation Act? 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The applicant is a practicing trial attorney with offices in 
Vernal, Utah and Salt Lake City, Utah. On June 28-29, 1985, the applicant 
sustained a severe heart attack during the course of his employment. The 
diary or schedule kept by his secretary shows that on June 28, 1985, he was 
scheduled for depositions in the morning, two trials in the Circuit Court, and 
a meeting with a client in the oil fields. Forty-five minutes after lunch, he 
had severe stomach pains prompting him to go to the Ashley Valley Medical 
Center. He had blood drawn and underwent an EKG and was told a serum test 
would be made. To his knowledge, he went to the oil field to meet with his 
client. Upon his return, he still didn't feel very good. He had dinner 
downtown, because his wife was in Salt Lake City. The hospital explained to 
him the reason for the blood serum test. Apparently they suspected an ulcer 
condition. He decided not to stay in the hospital, even though he had been 
asked to do so. The following morning, June 29, 1985, he returned to the 
Ashley Valley Medical Center for a repeat blood test and another EKG. He then 
went to his office, because he was so*eduled to be involved in depositions. 
2. The applicant proceeded with the depositions the morning of June 
29, 1985, but around 11:00 a.m., Dr. Norman Nielsen called from the hospital 
and informed the applicant he was having a heart attack and he was to get to 
the hospital immediately. He finished the deposition in which he was involved 
and then sent his secretary home to get some clothes. He then drove three 
blocks to the hospital. He was then sent by lifeline to Salt Lake City, where 
he was admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital. He recalls very little* that 
happened after that for a period of some fourteen days. He underwent a triple 
bypass surgery on July 1, 1985. He was told that he came very close to dying 
on a couple of occasions. He was released from the hospital on July 16, 
1985. He returned to active practice around August 12, 1985, but on a limited 
basis, avoiding court appearances, and has continued to do so to the present 
time. 
3. The applicant has a long documented history of prior heart 
disease, dating back fifteen years or so prior to the incident in questi:n. 
The risk factors contributing to his coronary atheroscerosis include heavy 
cigarette smoking, high cholesterolemia, facial xanthoma, heavy drinker of 
alcoholic beverages, type "A" personality, high blood pressure, and employment 
as a hard-driving, self-employed attorney who has been engaged in heavy trial 
work for more than twenty-five years. 
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4. It is difficult to quantify the stress associated with the 
applicant's particular practice of law. It is probably safe to assume that it 
was a more stressful practice than engaged in by most attorneys, but there is 
no indication that it was uniquely stressful. Chronic job stress is 
considered by cardiologists as one of the factors contributing to coronary 
atheroscerosis. As with many of the stress factors, they usually do not have 
an acute impact upon the development of the disease, but the long-term impact 
appears to be borne out in numerous case histories. 
5. The nurses* notes at the Ashley Valley Medical Center, recorded 
on June 28, 1985, are significant. They indicate he was 
•'admitted with complaints of chest pain since Sunday. 
He states that the pain comes and goes and also has 
complaints of pain to both arms.** 
See Exhibit "D-l", p. 83. There is some dispute as to whether or not he 
really complained of chest pains, or simply informed the nurse by pointing to 
his chest and across his shoulders, and this was construed as a description of 
chest pain. 
6. The Administrative Law Judge acknowledges the use of such terms 
as "heart attack" and "myocardial infarction" in this Order and in various 
medical records is accurate only in the broadest sense of those terms. More 
accurately, his condition is described as atherosclerotic heart disease and 
pending myocardial infarction with findings consistent with severe coronary 
insufficiency. Angiography performed on June 30th showed high grade stenosis 
of the three arteries in which bypass surgery was performed. The applicant 
had severe respiratory difficulties after surgery in addition to other 
problems and he was in the intensive care unit much longer than is normally 
the case. 
7. In dealing with the causation factors associated with the 
applicant's heart attack, it is important to understand the conflict of 
opinion that exists. Applicant's cardiologist, Dr. F. Clyde Null, offered the 
following explanation in response to an inquiry from applicant's attorney: 
"Atheroscerotic heart disease, of course, is exacer-
bated under symptoms of angina pectorus or made much worse 
under periods of emotional stress, pressure and tension. 
Prolonged hours of activity, striking degree of physical 
exertion, exposure to cold, or marked emotional pressure 
and tension frequently result in increased symptoms refer-
able to the heart. Mr. McRae has underlying atheroscler-
otic heart disease, and of course, all of the symptoms of 
that disorder can be made worse by heavy work loads and 
excessive emotional pressure and tension." 
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8 Dr. J. Joseph Perry, who is also a specialist in cardiology, 
offered the following explanation in response to an inquiry from the insurance 
adjuster: 
MThere was no change in his job requirements, the 
physical activity, number or hours worked, or stresses in 
the months prior to his myocardial infarction, compared to 
the years before this occurred. Therefore, there is no 
causal relationship of an acute nature with his myocardial 
infarction. The question of chronic job stress is a 
different issue. I think that there was a much greater 
contribution to his premature coronary atherosclerosis from 
his heavy cigarette smoking, his high cholesterolemia, and 
his facial xanthoma, as well as his type-A, hard-driving 
personality than one could attribute to his job as an 
attorney." 
9. After considering the foregoing possible scenarios and the 
importance of the role of stress, the Administrative Law Judge fin^s no 
convincing evidence of any unusual or acute stress with "regard to the 
applicant's work activities on the date of, or preceding» the onset of *he 
symptoms which led to his hospitalization and eventual bypass surgery. This 
is not to say that he was not working under stressful circumstances. To the 
contrary, as noted previously, the applicant's type and style of practice 
could justifiably be characterized as more stressful than most attorneys. It 
does not appear, however, as pointed out by Dr. Perry, that during the last 
week of June, 1985 there was any significant change in his job requirements, 
the level of his physical activity, the number or hours worked, or the 
stresses he had experienced in the months prior thereto. It is also 
significant to note that the history taken at the St. Mark's Hospital on June 
29, 1985, on the date of his admission is as follows: 
"This gentleman on 5-23-85 [6-23-85] noted the onset 
of substernal epigastric pain following a day of rather 
significant physical exertion that persisted for a short 
period of time then remissed with no medication. On the 
day following, as he awoke, he again noted the same 
substernal pain persisting longer and more intense and 
[than] at this time of the day previously. His wife 
checked his pulse and was aware that it was irregular. On 
the day following the chest pain occurred and reoccurred 
intermittently with recurring episodes of discomfort 
substernal and attended by some element of shortness of 
breath. By Friday, the chest pain was intermittent, 
severe, radiating to his neck and to his arms and to his 
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wrists. This was occurring bilaterally, but more severe on 
the left arm. He was seen in the emergency room at the 
Ashley Valley Hospital. An EKG was obtained that is 
reported to have shown some T-wave inversion in 2, 3, and 
AVF. Enczymes were said to be normal. However, because of 
the chest pain persisting and because of the concern of the 
doctors, he was called on Saturday, 6-29-85 for a revisit 
to the emergency room, at which time the EKG changes were 
more pronounced with definite T-wave inversion in 2, 3, and 
AVF, but also an elevated CPK of 417 and a isoenczyme of 66 
constituting a 15% range. Because of the EKG changes and 
the enczyme changes, he was air-evacuated to St. Mark's 
Hospital for evaluation and admission for further 
diagnostic studies.** (See Exhibit **D-1*', p. 64). 
For the foregoing reasons, the Administrative Law Judge finds the applicant 
has failed to meet his burden of proof in showing the requirements of legal 
causation or medical causation as set forth in the recent Utah Supreme Court 
case of Allen v. Industrial Commission, "[29 P.2d 25 (1986). Footnote 9 
referred to in the Allen decision is of particular significance when applied 
to the facts of this case. It reads: 
"Evidence of the ordinariness or unusualness of the 
employee's exertions may be relevant to the medical 
conclusion of causal connection. Where the injury results 
from latent symptoms with an illness such as heart disease, 
proof of medical causation may be especially difficult. 
Larsen's treatise cites many examples of cases where 
compensation claims were defeated because of inadequate 
proof of medical causation. See Larson, supra, Para. 
38.83(i) at 7-319 to -321. Compare Guidry v. Sline, Indus. 
Pointers, Inc., 418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982) heart attack 
triggered by stress, exertion, and strain greater than 
sedentary life of average worker compensable. 
Admittedly, there is case authority on both sides of the issue. But, as 
applied to the facts of the instant case, the Administrative Law Judge finds 
the analysis and opinion of Dr. Perry more jicurately reflects the causative 
factors leading to the applicant's hospitalization and bypass surgery, and the 
Administrative Law Judge adopts Dr. Perry's opinion as his own. In doing so, 
it should be noted that in analyzing the causative factors leading to heart 
problems, the risk factors are generally well know. Isolating which of those 
risk factors constitutes the actual cause appears to be an almost impossible 
task, but a consideration of the factors does allow for a considered opinion 
relative to the medical probabilities. The significance of this is emphasized 
by the Supreme Court's recent decision in the case of Lancaster v. Gilbert 
Development, filed April 20, 1987. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Only a portion of the relevant evidence is reflected in the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, but such is deemed sufficient to identify the issues and the 
basis for the determination that the applicant has failed to meet his burden 
of proof in establishing legal and medical causation. Accordingly, the claim 
of the applicant must necessarily be denied. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of the applicant be, and the 
same is hereby, denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Mouion for review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Richard G. Sumsion17 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
tr£g7?4s~day of June, 1987. 
ATTEST: 
Commission 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No: 85000739 
* 
* 
* 
* ORDER DENYING 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
I RECEIVED 
SEP 101387 
* * Workers Compensation Fund 
Legal Department 
On June 22, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying the 
applicant in the above-captioned case workers compensation benefits related to 
a June 29, 1985 incident in the course of employment and subsequent triple 
by-pass heart surgery performed on July 1, 1985. The Administrative Law Judge 
denied all benefits because the Administrative Law Judge found that neither 
legal nor medical cassation were established* The Administrative Law Judge 
cited the case Allen vs the Industrial Commission, 729 P2d 15 (Utah 1986) as 
authority for the proposition that both legal and medical cause must be 
established before an injury in the course of employment is compensable. The 
Administrative Law Judge found that the applicant's pre-existing 
arteriosclerotic heart condition required the applicant show that unusual 
exertion in the course of employment caused the need for the by-pass surgery 
in order to establish legal causation. The Administrative Law Judge found the 
events leading up to the hospitilization and surgery did not constitute 
unusual exertion. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge found legal 
causation was not established. Furthermore, the Administrative Law Judge 
found that the medical evidence taken as a whole, did not confirm that work 
related stress caused the need for surgery, and thus the Administrative Law 
Judge found no medical causation. As neither of the two elements of 
compensability were established (legal and medical causation), the 
Administrative Law Judge found the June 29, 1985 incident was not 
compensable. 
On August 10, 19?', pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-82.53, counsel for the 
applicant filed a Motion for Review. Counsel for the applicant argues that 
aggravation of a pre-existing condition is compensable according to both 
statutory and case law. He states that any question regarding whether an 
aggravation occurred should be submitted to a medical panel for resolution and 
should not be decided by the Administrative Law Judge. Counsel for the 
applicant cites numerous pre-Allen Supreme Court cases as authority for the 
proposition that only usual exertion is required for a finding of 
ROBERT M. MCRAE, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
MCRAE AND DELAND and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
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compensability, Zn the other hand, counsel for the applicant maintains t*~at 
the applicant was exposed to unusual exertion leading up to the by-pass 
surgery in the form of work related stress. Counsel for the applicant cites 
pre-Allen cases involving facts similar to the facts of the instant case as 
authority for the conclusion that stress can be exertion. Counsel for the 
applicant concludes that the work related stress the applicant experienced was 
unusual exertion which aggravated his pre-existing arteriosclerotic heart 
disease causing the need for by-pass surgery. Therefore, counsel for the 
applicant finds the June 29, 1985 work stress resulting in coronary 
insufficiency is compensable. 
On August 17, 1987, counsel for the defendant/Workers Compensation 
Fund filed a Response to the applicant's Motion for Review. Counsel for the 
defendant states U.C.A. 35-1-77's permissive language gives the Administrative 
Law Judge the discretion whether to refer a medical question to a medical 
panel for resolution. Counsel for the defendant states it is therefore not 
improper for the Administrative Law Judge to determine no medical panel 
referral is necessary and to decide the case based on medical evidence 
submitted at the hearing. Because there was medical evidence submitted that 
supports the .Administrative Law Judge's finding that the events leading up to 
the surgery were not t\±c legal or medical cause for the need fcr surgery, 
counsel ror the defendant maintains it was proper for the Administrative Law 
Judge to rely on that evidence in denying benefits. 
The Commission finds that the issues to be resolved on review are 
whether legal and medical cause are established by the facts in the instant 
case. This case presents the unique question regarding what amount of mental 
stress will objectively be considered unusual exertion so as to establish 
legal causation. This case also presents the difficult question of how to 
decide medical causation where even the medical experts decline to pinpoint a 
definitive cause for the internal failure. Many of the points made by counsel 
for the applicant in the Motion for Review are not contested. The Commission 
agrees pre-existing conditions aggravated by a work injury can be compensated 
and the Commission agrees mental stress can be considered exertion. The 
issues involved here are whether the facts in this case show the mental stress 
amounted to unusual exertion and whether the mental zcress medically caused an 
aggravation of the arteriosclerotic cornoary condition. Because the Allen 
case significantly changed the elements of compensability with respect to 
industrial injuries, just reviewing pre-Allen cases with similar facts is 
insufficient for purposes of determining compensability in this case. The 
Allen unusual exertion legal causation standard and the element of medical 
causation are the key issues here. 
In applying the unusual exertion legal causation standard, applicable 
to this case due to the pre-existing arteriosclerotic heart disease, the 
Commission must admit it is very difficult to determine what constitutes 
41 
ROBERT M. MCRAE 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
PAGE THREE 
unusually- exertive mental stress as compared to what the avevnge person 
encounters on a daily basis in non-employment life. The question becomes was 
the applicant's busy schedule as a trial attorney more mentally stressful than 
the average person's non-employment mental stresses of for example social 
confrontations, financial problems and/or the stress of raising children. 
This is a particularly perplexing problem and the Commission finds it 
difficult to weigh one mental stress against another objectively. To resolve 
the dilemma, the Commission must resort back to the language in Allen. 
To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a 
pre-existing condition must show that the employment 
_ contributed something substantial to increase the risk he 
^ already faced in everyday life because of his condition. 
This additional element of risk in the work place is 
usually supplied by an exertion greater than that 
undertaken in normal, everyday life. This extra exertion 
serves to offset the pre-existing condition of the employee 
as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims 
for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than 
exertions at work. 
The Commission finds the key language here is "contributed something 
substantial" to the risk already faced. If the work place does contribute 
something substantial, then legal cause is established. So the question 
becomes, did the applicant's work place stress contribute something 
substantial that increased the risk of heart failure that the applicant 
already faced due to his pre-existing condition. 
The question must be answered by viewing the medical evidence. Both 
doctors who review the question of contribution of work stress find work 
stress as one of a number of contributing factors to the risk of heart failure 
the applicant faced. The Administrative Law Judge chose to rely on Dr. 
Perry's statement as follows: 
The question of chronic job stress is a different issue. I 
think that there was a much greater contribution to his 
premature coronary artherosclerosis from his heavy 
cigarette smoking, his high cholesterolemia, and his facial 
xanthoma, as well as his type-A hard-driving personality 
than one could attribute to his job as an attorney. 
Counsel for the applicant cites Dr. Null's statement as follows: 
In my opinion, the emotional stress and tension related to 
his occupation are certainly associated with an aggravation 
to produce his mild myocardial infarction. 
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Dr. Perryfs statement looks to quantifying how substantial the work stress 
factor was in comparison to the pre-existing factors. Dr. Null's does not. 
Because the issue needing resolution, according to the above-cited language 
""•") from Allen, is whether the work contribution is substantial, the Commission 
/ finds the Administrative Law Judge properly relied on the medical evidence 
that best addresses the question of how substantial the work contribution 
was. Furthermore, just from a logical standpoint, where there are still 5 
V, major risk factors present even in the absence of the work stress factor, it 
"-*v) would seem adding one more factor is not a substantial contribution. The 
* Commission also finds that Dr. Null's opinion is not completely at odds with 
that of Dr. Perry. Dr. Perry merely elaborates more definitively in his 
analysis. As such, the Commission finds* it was not mandatory that a medical 
panel be appointed to resolve a medical controversy as no true controversy is 
""/ evident. The Commission finds the Administrative Law Judge correctly 
determined legal causation was not established as the work stress did not 
contribute substantially to the risk of heart failure. Because legal 
causation is not established, there is no need to review the issue regarding 
medical causation. Based on the failure to establish one of the necessary 
elements of compensability, legal causation, the Commission finds the 
Administrative Law Judge's denial of benefits s'r»ruld be affirmed. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's August 10, 1987 Motion 
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's June 22, 1987 Order is 
hereby affirmed and final with further appeal to the Court of Appeals only 
pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-83. , 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on September / 1987, a copy of the attached 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of ROBERT M. MCRAE was mailed to 
the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Robert McRae 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Keith E. Sohm 
Attorney at Law 
2057 Lincoln Lane 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
/ 
(/Elliott K. Morris 
Attorney at' Law 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
P.O. Box 45420 
SLC, UT 84145-0420 
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge 
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
- ; 
By y^^^J^L^L^Lym//^ 
Pamela Hayes 
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J. JOSEPH PERRY M.D, EA.C.C. 
CARDIOLOGY 
COTTONWOOD MEDICAL TOWER 
5770 SOUTH 250 EAST, SUITE 340 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
September 18, 1986 
Vickie Rhoads 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
560 S. 300 E. 
P.O. Box 45420 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0420 
Dear Ms. Rhoads, 
In response to your letter of September 11, 1986 regarding Robert McRae, 
File #85-23000, I submit the following answers to your questions. 
1. Is it probable that the stress of Mr. McRaeTs job caused or con-
tributed to his myocardial infarction, June 28, 1985? 
There was no change in his job requirements, the physical activity, 
number or hours worked, or stresses in the months prior to his 
myocardial infarction, compared to the years before this occurred. 
Therefore, thei" is no causal relationship of an acute nature with 
his myocardial infarction. The question of chronic job stress is 
a different issue. I think that there was a much greater con-
tribution to his premature coronary atherosclerosis from his 
heavy cigerette smoking, his high cholesterolemia, and his 
facial xanthoma, as well as his type-A, hard-driving personality 
than one could attribute to his job as an attorney. 
Was the need for bypass surgery caused by or accelerated by job 
stress? 
No^ .;\Again, as noted above there was no immediate or acute change in 
his work requirements or performance. 
3. Hajs Mr. McRaeTs condition stablized? 
Yed. It has been stable for approximately six to nine months which 
gave him three to six months to recover from his surgical proceedure. 
Does Mr. McRae suffer any permanent partial impairment? 
Yes. Mr. McRae has permanent impairment, but since I don't feel 
it could be definately job related, 100% of that impairment is 
related to pre-existing conditions. 
Sincerely, 
J. Joseph Perry, M 
JJP:dmt 
TELEPHONE (801)266-3418 
2. 
related 
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ALLEN v. INDU 
Cite as 729 P.2d 
Robert A. ALLEN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Board of 
Review, Jer Ken, Inc., State Insurance 
Fund and Second Injury Fund, Defend-
ants. 
No. 20026. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 14, 1986. 
Worker, who sustained lower back in-
juries while stacking milk crates containing 
four to six gallons of milk, sought review 
of an order of the Industrial Commission, 
denying his motion for review of an order 
of an administrative law judge denying his 
workers' compensation claim. The Su-
preme Court, Durham, J., held that- (1) 
finding t>°t worker's injury was not "by 
accident* was not based on ""le evidence 
and, thus, was erroneous, but (2) worker's 
claim would be remanded for further fact 
finding as to whether action of worker, 
who had previous back problems, in lifting 
several piles of milk crates exceeded exer-
tion which average person typically under-
took in nonemployment life and whether 
medically demcnstrable causal link existed 
between worker's lifting and injury to his 
back. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Hall, C.J., filed opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, with Stewart, 
Associate C.J., joining in the dissent. 
Stew«vt, Associate C.J., dissented and 
filed opinion. 
1. Evidence <£=>18 
Supreme Court took judicial notice that 
liquid milk weighs about the same as liquid 
water or approximately eight and one-third 
pounds per gallon; thus, four gallons of 
milk weigh about 33 pounds without the 
containers and crate, and six gallons of 
milk weigh about 50 pounds without con-
tainers and crate. 
STRIAL COM'N Utah 15 
15 (Utah 1986) 
2. Workers' Compensation <s=>515 
For purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, key requirement of an "accident" is 
that occurrence be unanticipated, un-
planned, and unintended; where either 
cause of injury or result of exertion is 
different from what would normally be ex-
pected to occur, occurrence is unplanned, 
unforeseen, and unintended and, thus, by 
"accident"; clarifying Carling v. Industri-
al Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 
202. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Workers' Compensation <s==515 
For purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, proof of unusual event may be helpful 
in determining causal connection between 
injury and employment; however, proof of 
unusual event is not required as an elenv nt 
of requirement that injury *>< "by acci-
dent." U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
4. Workers' Compensation <s^515 
An "accident," for purposes of require-
ment that injury be "by accident" to be 
compensable under Workers' Compensation 
Act, is an unexpected or unintended occur-
rence that may be either the cause or the 
result of an injury; abandoning Redman 
Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283; 
Church of Jesus Chnst of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 
P.2d 328 (Utah); Farmer's Grain Cooper-
ative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah); 
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 
(Uta^); Billings Computer Corp. v. Tar-
an(,o, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah). U.C.A.1953, 
35^1-45. 
5. Workers' Compensation <^568 
Key question in workers' compensation 
case in determining causation is whether, 
given worker's body and worker's exertion, 
the exertion in fact contributed to the inju-
ry. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
6. Workers' Compensation e=>552, 568 
Only those injuries which occur be-
cause some condition or exertion required 
by employment increases risk of injury 
48 
16 Utah 729 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
which worker normally faces in his every-
day life is compensable under Workers' 
Compensation Act; injuries which coinci-
dentally occur at work because preexisting 
condition results in symptoms which appear 
during work hours without any enhance-
ment from the work place are not compen-
sable. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
7. Workers' Compensation <s=597 
For purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, two-part causation test, requiring con-
sideration of legal cause and medical cause 
of injury, is required in determining wheth-
er causal connection exists between injury 
and worker's employment; abandoning 
Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 
P.2d 104 (Utah); Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. 
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah); Church of Je-
sus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Indus-
trial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah); 
IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828 
(Utah); Nuzum v. Roose^dahl Construc-
tion and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 
(Utah); Jones i California Packinb 
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640; Robert-
son v. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah 
25, 163 P.2d 331; Thomas D. Dee Memori-
al Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 233; Kaiser 
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(Utah); Schmidt v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 617 P.2d 693 OJtah); Residential and 
Commercial Construction Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah); 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740; Baker v. Indus-
trial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 
P.2d 613; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
8. Workers' Compensation <$=*5o3 
Where claimant suffers from preexist-
ing condition which contributes to injury, 
unusual or extraordinary exertion is re-
quired to prove "legal causation," for pur-
poses of two-part causation test for deter-
mining whether causal connection exists 
between claimant's injury and claimant's 
employment; where there is no preexisting 
condition, a usual or an ordinary exertion is 
sufficient to prove legal causation. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-45. 
9. Workers' Compensation <s=>597 
For purposes of legal causation ele-
ment of two-pait test for determining 
whether causal connection exists between 
claimant's injury and claimant's employ-
ment, precipitating exertion must be com-
pared with usual wear and tear and exer-
tions of nonemployment life of people in 
general, not nonemployment life of the par-
ticular claimant in question. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-45. 
10. Workers' Compensation <e=>597 
Under medical causation portion of 
two-part test for determining whether 
causal connection exists between claimant's 
injury and claimant's employment, claimant 
must show by evidence, opinion, or other-
wise that stress, strain, or exertion re-
quired by his or her occupation lod to re-
sulting injury or Usability. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-45. 
11. Workers' Compensation <§=>1390 
Evidence of ordinariness or usualness 
of employee's exertions may be relevant to 
medical conclusion of causal connection be-
tween claimant's injury and claimant's em-
ployment. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
12. Workers' Compensation <s=>1533 
Finding that claimant's lower back in-
jury was not "by accident" as claimant was 
stacking milk crates was not based on the 
evidence and, thus, was erroneous; claim-
ant experienced unexpected and unantic-
ipated injury to his back as he lifted crate 
of milk in cramped area of cooler, claimant 
had not complained of pain or limitations at 
his job, and no evidence indicated that inju-
ry was predictable ~^ developed gradually 
as with occupational disease or progressive 
back disorder. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
13. Workers' Compensation <e=>1950 
Compensation claim of worker, who 
had preexisting back problems and sus-
tained lower back injuries while stacking 
crates containing four to six gallons of 
milk, was remanded for further fact find-
ing on issue as to whether moving and 
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lifting several piles of crates weighing 30 
to 50 pounds in confined area of cooler 
exceeded exertion average person typically 
undertook in nonemployment Tife ara 
whether there was medically demonstrable 
causal link between worker's action in lift-
ing milk crates and injur^ T to his back and, 
thus, ultimately, whether his injury "arose 
out of or in the course of employment/' 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
Michael E. Bulson, Ogden, for plaintiff. 
Gilbert Martinez, Salt Lake City, for Sec-
ond Injury. 
Fred R. Silvester, James R. Black, Salt 
Lake City, for State Ins. Fund. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Claimant Robert A. Allen seeks a review 
from the Industrial Commission's denial of 
his motion for review of an administrative 
law judge order denying him compensation 
for a back injury sustained at work. For 
the reasons stated '^elow, ;^e reverse an<J 
remand. 
[1] On November 23, 1982, the claim-
ant, aged 36, was employed as night man-
ager of Kent's Foods. The claimant testi-
fied to the following version of events at a 
hearing before an administrative law 
judge. The claimant was working in a 
confined cooler in the store stacking crates, 
containing four to six gallons l of milk, 
from the floor onto a cooler shelf. While 
lifting one crate to about chest level, he 
suddenly felt a sharp pain in his lower 
back. He immediately set down the crate 
and asked another employee to continue 
stocking the shelves. The claimant com-
pleted Sie one-half hour remaining in his 
shift doing desk work. That night fhe pain 
increased, and by morning**his left leg felt 
numb. Four or five days later, he saw Dr. 
Ivan Wright about his back problem. Ini-
tial doctor visits during December were 
followed through with the prescribed treat-
1. We take judicial notice that liquid milk weighs 
about the same as liquid water or approximately 
8V3 pounds per gallon. Thus, four gallons of 
milk weigh about 33 pounds without the con-
TRIAL COM'N Utah 17 
5 (Utah 1986) 
ment of bed rest and medication. A myelo-
gram finally revealed a herniated disc, and 
the claimant spent ten days in traction in 
the hospital in early January. He did not 
return to work. 
The claimant also testified he had a histo-
ry of prior back injuries, including a fall 
from a telephone pole at age fourteen 
which required him to wear a back brace 
for several months, a back injury in 1977 
while lifting sand bags for the Logan 
School District, and another fall while 
working for that employer when he slipped 
on a slick concrete ramp and broke his 
coccyx. None of the prior injuries resulted 
in prolonged absences from work. 
The testimony from other sources varied 
slightly from the report given by the claim-
ant. The employer's report of injury de-
scribes the accident as "picking up freight 
and stocking it on shelves, lifting boxes 
and stacking them from truck." No specif-
ic event was mentioned in the employer's 
reporf The medical records of treating 
phys-aans described the claimant's previ-
ous injuries, but omitted any reference to a 
specific incident in the cooler. Dr. Hannan, 
who examined the claimant on December 
31, 1982, wrote, "He does not remember 
any distinct episode as having precipitated 
his current problem, however." And in a 
letter from Dr. Bryner to Dr. Wright dated 
January 13, 1983, the claimant's history 
was related as follows: "About six weeks 
ago, however, he was lifting material at 
work, and recalls no specific injury or 
stress but developed discomfort in his left 
groin area which ultimately extended into 
his big toe." 
The administrative law judge found that 
the claimant's injury to his back on Novem-
ber 23, 1982, was not "an injury by acci-
dent arising out of or in the course of 
employment." It is apparent that the ad-
ministrative law judge, using a specific epi-
sode analysis, concluded there was no "ac-
cident" because there was no identifiable 
tainers and crate. Six gallons of milk weigh 
approximately 50 pounds without the containers 
and crate. 
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event that caused the injury and because 
lifting the crates of milk was a routine and 
commonplace exertion expected of the job. 
The administrative law judge analogized 
the facts of this case to Farmer's Grain 
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1980), where a gradually developed back 
injury was held to be not compensable 
where the condition worsened without the 
intervention of any external occurrence or 
trauma. 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the 
claimant, who had suffered preexisting 
back problems and was injured as the re-
sult of an exertion usual and typical for his 
job, was injured "by accident arising out of 
or in the course of employment" as re-
quired by the Workers' Compensation Act, 
U.C.A, 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986). That 
Act, in pertinent part, provides: 
Every employee . . . who is injured . . . 
by accident arising out of or in the 
course of his e ^oloyment .. shall h,e 
paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account cf .he injury.... 
Id. This statute creates two prerequisites 
for a finding of a compensable injury. 
First, the injury must be "by accident/' 
Second, the language "arising out of or in 
the course of employment" requires that 
there be a causal connection between the 
injury and the employment. See Pitts-
burgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 
P.2d 1367. 1370 (Utah 1983). Prior deci-
sions by this Court have often failed to 
distinguish the analysis of the accident 
question from the discussion of causation 
elements.2 As a result, this Court and the 
Commission are faced with confusing and 
often inconsistent precedent. For this rea-
2. We note that man\ of our prior opinions so 
intermingled the cair°tion and accident analy-
ses that it is impossible to segregate them and 
determine the basis for the Court's decision. 
For example, the opinion in Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. 
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982), mixes the acci-
dent and causation elements in the following 
language: "It appears to be mere coincidence 
that defendant's injury . . . occurred at work. 
Defendant bears the burden of showing other-
wise. Proof of the causal relationship of duties 
of employment to unexpected injury is simply 
lacking. . . . [T]he Commission's conclusion 
that an accident occurred is without anv sub-
son we now undertake a fresh look at the 
policy and historical background of the 
workers' compensation statute in an at-
tempt to provide a clear and workable rule 
for future application by the Commission. 
I. 
The term "by accident" is not defined in 
the workers' compensation statutes. The 
most frequently referenced authority for 
the definition of "by accident" is the case 
of Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), v/here the 
term was defined as follows: 
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from 
what would normally be expected to oc-
cur in the usual course of events . . . . 
[T]his is" not necessarily restricted to 
some single incident which happened sud-
denly at one particular time and does not 
preclude the possibility that due to exer-
tion, st/ess or other repetitive cause, a 
climax mieht be reached in such manner 
as to propurly fall within the definition of 
an accident as just stated above. How-
ever, such an occurrence must be distin-
guished from gradually developing condi-
tions which are classified as occupational 
diseases.. . . 
Id. at 261-62, 399 P.2d at 203 (citing Jones 
v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 
612, 616, 244 P.2d 640, 642 (1952), and 
Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949)). 
Some confusion has developed as to wheth-
er "by accident" requires proof of an un-
usual event. This issue frequently arises 
when the employee suffers an internal fail-
ure 3 brought about by exertions in the 
stantive support in the record." Id. at 726 (foot-
notes omitted). See also Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 590 
P.2d 328, 329-30 (Utah 1979); Pintar v. Industri-
al Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d 414 (1963). 
For an example of an opinion which does sepa-
rate the accident and causation analysis, see 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 328, 330-31 (Utah 
1979) (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
3. An "internal failure" refers to a category of 
injuries that arise from general organ or struc-
tural failure brought about by an exertion in the 
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workplace. It is clear, however, that our 
cases have defined "by accident'' to include 
internal failures resulting from both usual 
and unusual exertions. See Schmidt v. 
Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 
(Utah 1980). 
This Court first discussed the term "by 
accident" in Tintic Milling Co. v. Industri-
al Commission, 60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278 
(1922), where an accident was said to be 
"something out of the ordinary, unex-
pected, and definitely located as to time 
and place." 60 Utah at 22, 206 P. at 281. 
This definition was used to distinguish inju-
ries which occurred gradually and were 
covered under statutory provisions for oc-
cupational disease. Id. The Court in Tin-
tic Milling also acknowledged that where 
the claimant suffers an internal failure the 
"unexpected result" rule of the seminal 
English case of Fenton v. Thorley, [1903] 
A.C. 443, 72 L.J.K. 789, 5 W.C.C. 1, is 
appropriate. The Court in Tintic Milling 
observed: 
"Since the -\;se of Fenton v. Th'*iey, 
nothing more is required than that the 
harm that the plaintiff has sustained 
shall be unexpected.... It is enough 
that the causes, themselves known and 
usual, should produce a result which on 
a particular occasion is neither designed 
nor expected. The test as to whether an 
injury is unexpected, and so, if received 
on a single occasion, occurs 'by accident,' 
is that the sufferer did not intend or 
expect that injury would on that particu-
lar occasion result from what he was 
doing." 
60 Utah at 26, 206 P. at 282 (quoting Boh-
len, A Problem in The Drafting of Work-
men's Compensation Acts, 25 Harv.L.frav. 
328, 340 (1912) (emphasis added)). Accord-
ingly, the Court in Twtic affirmed a find-
ing that the employee, whose previous res-
piratory problems were aggravated by en-
tering a roasting flue, had suffered a com-
pensable accident. 
workplace. Internal failure claims evaluated by 
this Court include heart attacks, hernias, and 
back injuries. See generally, Note, Schmidt v. 
Industrial Commission and Injury Compensabili-
>TRIAL COM'N Utah 19 
5 (Utah 1986) 
After Tintic Milling, the Court tempo-
rarily rejected the "unexpected result" def-
inition of Fenton v. Thorley in internal 
failure cases on the ground that the defini-
tion of "by accident" required an unusual 
occurrence or exertion. In Bamberger v. 
Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 203, 240 
P. 1103 (1925), the Court denied compensa-
tion to a worker who unexpectedly suf-
fered a heart attack while manually unload-
ing a railroad car of coal on the ground 
that no overexertion occurred during the 
work. 66 Utah at 208, 240 P. at 1104. 
That decision was apparently overruled, 
however, when the Court embraced the 
"unexpected result" rule and awarded com-
pensation to an employee who suffered a 
heart attack after overexertions while rou-
tinely cleaning the weirs to a city reservoir. 
Hammond v. Industrial Commission, 84 
Utah 67, 87, 34 P.2d 687, 695 (1934) (Mof-
fat, J., concurring). Hammond was fol-
lowed in Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 92 InJ i 72, 66 P.2d 124 
(1937), where :. unanimous Court he1 J that 
the employee, who had suffered a ruptured 
aorta from riding a caterpillar tractor over 
rough ground, suffered an injury "by acci-
dent" since the result was "an unusual, 
unforeseen, and unexpected event or occur-
rence" and definite as to time and place. 
Id. at 92, 66 P.2d at 134. And, in Thomas 
D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 
233 (1943), the Court sustained an award of 
benefits to a claimant who had suffered 
from heart disease and experienced a heart 
attack shortly after moving 52 boxes 
weighing 50 to 100 pounds and 28 sacks of 
fire clay—work that was unusually heavy 
and greatly in excess of his ordinary 
duties. The Court pointed our, in dicta, 
that the English common law would have 
awarded compensation even if the exer-
tions were ordinary and usually required as 
part of the job. 104 Utah at 67-71, 138 
P.2d at 235-39. Quoting from the Bohlen 
article, supra, the Court observed: 
ty under Utah Worker's Compensation Law: A 
Just Result or Just Another "Living Corpse'?, 
1981 Utah L.Rev. 393. 
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"[N]othing more is required than that • and the legislature by failing to amend has 
the harm that the plaintiff has sustained acquiesced in that construction." 115 Utah 
shall be unexpected The element of at 15, 201 P.2d ai 968. 
unexpectedness inherent in the word 'ac-
 T h e h o l d i n g o f PuHty Biscuit a ] s o 
cident' is sufficiently supplied . . . if,
 s q u a r e i y ^b raced the concept that an or-
though the act is usual and the condi-
 d i n a r y o r u s u a l exertion that results in an 
tions normal, it causes a harm unfore-
 u n e x pected injury is compensable. See 115 
seen by him who suffers it."
 U t a h a t l g _ 1 9 j m p a t % 9 _ 7 0 A f t e r 
104 Utah at 70, 138 P.2d at 237. carefully considering the legislative pur-
Six years later in Purity Biscuit Co. v. pose of the workers' compensation statute, 
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 prior precedent, and public policy, the 
P.2d 961 (1949), this Court explicitly Court rejected the requirement that proof 
adopted the English rule for the definition of an unusual activity or exertion be a 
of an accident and awarded benefits to a required element of the "by accident" defi-
claimant who unexpectedly injured his back nition. 115 Utah at 14-20, 201 P.2d at 
while stepping on the brake pedal of a 967-70. The Court concluded that "there 
delivery truck—a usual and ordinary activi- is nothing in the statute which would justi-
ty. See 115 Utah 14-20, 201 P.2d 967-70. fy a holding that an injury is compensable 
After summarizing early Utah cases inter- where overexertion is shown but is not 
preting "by accident" the Court concluded compensable where only ordinary exertion 
that "since 1922 this .-ourt has uniformly is shown, provided that in both cases it is 
held that an unexpected internal failure shown that Jic exertion causes the inju-
meets the requirements of ["by accident"] ry." 4 115 Utan at 19, 201 P.2d at 970. 
4. The holding of Purity Biscuit was questioned 
in Mellen v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 373, 
431 P.2d 798 (1967), where the opinion errone-
ously stated that Purity Biscuit "has never been 
cited by this or any other court to support the 
law of that case." 19 Utah 2d at 375, 431 P.2d at 
799. In fact, by 1967 Purity Biscuit had been 
relied upon in decisions from the courts of nine 
other states. Alabama Textiles Prods. Corp. v. 
Grantham, 263 Ala. 179, 183-84, 82 So.2d 204, 
208 (1955) (finding of unusual strain or exertion 
unnecessary to support conclusion that claimant 
suffered injury by accident); Bryant Stave & 
Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 151-52, 296 
S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (1956) {Purity Biscuit cited 
as stating majority position that usual exertion 
causing an internal failure may be by accident); 
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 
231 Cal.App.2d 111, 41 Cal.Rptr. 628, 635 (1964) 
(relying upon causation rule of Purify Biscuit); 
Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co., 138 Sc.ld 308, 314 
(Fla.1962) (back herniation from r 'pture of in-
tervertebral disc satisfies statutory requirement 
of suddenness); Roman v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 
268 Minn. 367, 380, 129 N.W.2d 550, 559 (1964) 
(calls Purity Biscuit "a well-considered work-
men's compensation case" that supported an 
award where many factors led to the disability); 
Murphy v. Anaconda Co., 133 Mont. 198, 208, 
321 P.2d 1094, 1100 (1958) (quoting favorably 
the reliance on Purity Biscuit in Bryant Stave, 
227 Ark. at 151-52, 296 S.W.2d at 439-40, and 
holding that a usual exertion may lead to a 
compensable injury where the causal relation-
ship is established); Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 
10 K.J. 325, 327-28, 91 A.2d 569, 570 (1952) {Pu-
rity Biscuit cited in support of rule that internal 
failure from ordinary or usual exertion is an 
"injury by accident"); Olson v. State Indust. 
Accident Comm'n, 222 Or. 407, 416-17, 352 P.2d 
1096, 1101 (1960) (O'Connell, J., specially con-
curring) (dissent to Purity Biscuit quoted); Coo-
per v. Vinatieri, 73 S.D. 418, 424, 43 N.W.2d 747, 
750-51 (1950) {Purity Biscuit cited as an exam-
ple of the divergent viewpoints for defining a 
compensable accident). 
In addition, the decision in Purity Biscuit was 
relied upon by the majority in three Utah cases. 
See Jones v. California Packing Co., 121 Utah 
612, 244 P.2d 640, 642; Carling v. Industrial 
Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202; 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 
140, 427 P.2d 740. Despite this support for the 
decision in Purity Biscuit, the Court in Mellen 
concluded without further discussion that "[t]he 
Purity Biscuit decision ccrtainh needs a healthy 
reappraisement." 19 Utah 2d at 376, 431 P.2d at 
800. Two ye*»-s later in Redman Warehousing 
Corp. v. Indus., .at Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 
P.2d 283 (1969), the Court again questioned the 
Purity Biscuit decision in a superficial analysis 
that concluded: "Purity enjoys the unique and 
doubtful distinction of being a living corpse." 
22 Utah 2d at 403, 454 P.2d at 286. After 
considering those cases from Utah and other 
jurisdictions that have relied on Purity Biscuit, 
we now cannot agree that it was a "living 
corpse." Moreover, even if Purity Biscuit lay 
dormant, it was resurrected by Schmidt v. In-
dustrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 
1980). 
53 
ALLEN v. INPU 
Cite as 729 P.2d 
Since Purity Biscuit, numerous cases 
have held that an internal injury may be 
compensable if it results from either a 
usual or unusual exertion in the course of 
employment. See, e.g., Champion Home 
Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 
P.2d 306 (Utah 1985) (perforated ^ulcer 
caused by lifting an unusually heavy 
beam); Pittsburg Testing Laboratories V. 
Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367 (unforeseen and 
unanticipated heart attack resulting from 
exertion while inspecting roof structure); 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 
888 (Utah 1981) (back injury resulting from 
shoveling coal compensable despite usual-
ness of activity and presence of preexisting 
conditions); Painter Motor v. Ostler, 617 
P 2d 975 (Utah 1980) (back injury resulting 
from moving heavy boxes and installing 
electrical equipment); Schmidt v. Industri-
al Commission, 6YJ P.2d 69S {Utah W8ty 
(back injury resulting from carrying steel 
plates compensable despite prior history of 
back disorders and ordinary activity); 
United States Steel Corp. v. Draper-* 613 
P2d 508 (Utah 1980) C x r t attack result-
ing from exertion while rushing to drown-
ing accident); IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 
584 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978) (heart attack re-
sulting from heavy lifting); Nuzum v. Roo-
sendakl Construction & Mining Corp., 
565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977) (truck driver 
suffered heart attack after repeatedly 
climbing long steps); Residential & Com-
mercial Construction Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) 
(back injury resulting from moving lum-
ber); Powers v. Industrial Commission, 
19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740 (1967) (heart 
distress occurring over a period of several 
months compensable despite preexisting 
condiuons); Baker v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) 
(back injury resulting from filing papers in 
lower drawer compensable). 
Despite the strong precedential support 
for applying the "unexpected result" rule 
of Purity Biscuit to internal failure cases, 
a separate line of opposing authority has 
developed which requires overexertion or 
an unusual event to prove an injury oc-
curred "by accident/' Typically, these 
ATRIAL COM'N Utah 21 
.5 (Utah 1986) 
cases denied compensation because the 
claimants' ordinary work duties precipitat-
ed the injury. Consequently, there were no 
events or exertions that were unusual or 
extraordinary to qualify as "by accident." 
See, e.g., Billings Computer Corp. v. Tar-
ango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) (compensa-
tion for knee injury denied where circum-
stances precipitating the injury were com-
monplace and usual); Sabo's Electronic 
Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982) 
(back injury from loading box of twelve 
radios into van not compensable); Fabl-
er's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 
237 (Utah 1980) (back injury to claimant 
with preexisting condition resulting from 
delivery of 100-pound sacks not compensa-
ble since the activity was not unusual or 
unexpected); Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) (back injury 
suffered by janitor upon standing up not 
compensable without evidence tnat activi-
ties wore unusual); Redman Warehousing 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 
. ' 398, <S4 P.2d 283 (1969) (back injury 
precipitated by sitting and driving a mov-
ing van not compensable without proof of 
an unusual event). These cases will not be 
collectively referred to as the Redman line 
of cases. 
[2] We are now convinced that the Red-
man line of cases has misconstrued the 
historical and logical definition of "by acci-
dent." The Redman line of cases relied on 
the following abridged version of the defi-
nition of an accident found in Carling v. 
Industrial Commission: "[Accident] con-
notes an unanticipated, unintended occur-
rence, different /rom what would norraal-
ly be expected to occur in the usuu 
course of events" 16 Utah at 261, 3C9 
P.2d at 203 (emphasis added; footnotes 
omitted). In Redman, the highlighted 
phrase was interpreted to require an un-
usual event before there can be an acci-
dent. This interpretation misconstrues the 
Carling decision itself and is inconsistent 
with the English definition of "by accident" 
used by this Court since 1922. The key 
requirement of an accident under the Car-
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ling decision, as well as prior decisions, 
was that the occurrence be unanticipated, 
unplanned and unintended. The highlight-
ed phrase emphasisd that where either the 
cause of the injury or the result of an 
exertion was different from what would 
normally be expected to occur, the occur-
rence was unplanned, unforeseen, unin-
tended and therefore "by accident." 
Policy considerations also militate in fa-
vor of rejecting the notion that the phrase 
"by accident" requires an unusual event. 
There is nothing in the term "accident" 
that suggests that only that which is un-
usual is accidental. See Robertson v. In-
dustrial Commission, 109 Utah at 33, 40, 
163 P.2d at 335, 338 (Wade, J., concurring; 
Wolfe, J., dissenting). An accident does 
not occur simply because a wrorker is in-
jured during an unusual activity. This ar-
gument is illustrated by Professor Larson 
in his treatise on workmen's compensation 
with the following example 
If an employee intentionally anu know-
ing! •' undertakes to lift a: .msual load, 
the cause (i.e., the lifting) is no more 
accidental than if he deliberately lifted a 
normal load. Or if a gardener deliberate-
ly continues to mow the lawn in the rain, 
a passerby observing him would not say 
that he was undergoing an accident 
merely because it is unusual to mow 
lawns in the rain. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.-
62, at 7-162 (1986) (footnotes omitted). 
Larson also criticizes the usual-unusual 
distinction as being unworkable in practice. 
Realistically, it is impossible to determine 
what are the usual and normal require-
ments of a job People work in good 
weather and bad, lift heavy items as well 
as light ones, and work for long hours as 
well as short ^"es. None of these activi-
ties may be unusual or unexpected. Id. 
§ 38.63 at 7-164 to -168. 
The unworkability of the usual-unusual 
event requirement is further evidenced by 
comparing seemingly irreconcilable deci-
sions by this Court. Compare Kaiser 
Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (back inju-
ry to miner with previous back problems 
held to be a compensable accident despite 
being caused by shoveling coal in the usual 
course of employment), with Fanner's 
Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 
(no accident where worker with previous 
back problems sustained back injury while 
delivering 100-pound bags of whey); com-
pare Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 
Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (compensable 
accident for back injury resulting from fil-
ing paper in lower drawer) with Billings 
Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 
(no accident where worker sustained knee 
injury resulting from bending to pick up 
small parts). 
[3, 4] We believe that the Court's real 
concern in the Redman line of cases was 
the presence or absence of proof of causa-
tion to support an award of compensation. 
See generally Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Sa 'nts, 590 P.2d at 332 (Wil-
kins, J., dissenting). As will be discussed 
in tue next section, the Court has developed 
two parallel lines of authority on the causa-
tion issue, one of which requires an un-
usual event in order to meet the statutory 
causation requirement. Although proof of 
an unusual event may be helpful in deter-
mining causation, it is not required as an 
element of "by accident" in section 35—1-
45. "[T]he basic and indispensable ingredi-
ent of 'accident' is unexpectedness." 
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 696 (Wilkins, J., con-
curring) (quoting IB Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation, at 7-5 (1980). We there-
fore reaffirm those cases which hold that 
an accident is an unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that may be either the cause or 
the result of an injury. We thus necessar-
ily abandon the analysis <>\ "by accident" in 
the Redman line of cases which predicates 
the "accident" determination upon the oc-
currence of an unusual event. 
II. 
The second element of a compensable 
accident requires proof of a causal connec-
tion between the injury and the worker's 
employment duties. Pittsburg Testing 
Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370 
(Utah 1983). In workers' compensation 
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cases involving internal failures, the key 
issue is usually one of causation. Ordinari-
ly, causation is proved by the production 
and interpretation of medical evidence ei-
ther alone or together with other evidence. 
See Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367, 1370; 
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 
P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980). Because of the 
difficulties of diagnosis of internal failures 
and because of the possibility that a preex-
isting condition may have contributed to 
the injury, special causation rules have 
been developed for internal failure cases. 
See Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-269; Pu-
rity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 115 Utah 1, 20-21, 201 P.2d 970-71 
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially). 
This Court initially responded to the 
problem of causation in internal failure 
cases by suggesting that the Commission 
use a clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard when an internal failure was caused 
by an exertion in the workplace.5 See 
Thomas D. Dee Men ^ rial Hospital Ass'n. 
v Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 
74, 138 P.2d 2o6, 238 (1943). The CICL/ and 
convincing evidence standard was rejected, 
however, in Lipman v. Industrial Com-
mission, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979), 
with the rationale that such a standard 
would make workers' compensation bene-
fits nearly impossible to recover where the 
deceased suffered from a preexisting condi-
tion. Accordingly, the standard to prove 
causal connection is preponderance of the 
evidence. Id. 
The second method that has been used to 
ensure causal connection in internal failure 
cases is to require proof that an unusual 
event or activity precipitated the injury. 
Presumably, this requirement was usr d to 
prevent compensating a person predisposed 
to internal failure where the preexisting 
condition contributed' more to the injury 
than his usual work activity. The follow-
ing internal failure cases illustrate that evi-
dence of an unusual event or activity is 
necessary to prove causation. Billings 
5. In Nebraska, an enhanced standard of proof is 
still used where the employee suffers from a 
preexisting condition. See Mann v. City of 
ATRIAL COM'N Utah 23 
5 (Utah 1986) 
Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104, 
106-07 (Utah 1983); Sabo's Electronic Ser-
vice v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722, 726 n. 12 (Utah 
1982); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 
590 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1979); IGA Food 
Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 829 (Utah 
1978); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construc-
tion & Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146 
(Utah 1977); Jones v. California Packing 
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640 (1952); 
Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 
Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D. 
Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Industri-
al Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d at 
233; see Schviidt, 617 P.2d at 697-99 
(Crockett, J., dissenting); Farmer's Grain 
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237, 238-
39 (Utah 1980); Mellen v. Industrial Com-
mission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 374, 431 P.2d 798, 
799 (1967); Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 30, 
201 P.2d at 975 (Latimer, J., dissenting). 
Defendants argue that any rule that 
awards compensation based on usual exer-
tion will open the fl^.dgates for payment 
of benefits f?r all internal injuriec that 
coincidentally occur at work. They ^aim 
that the unusual exertion requirement is 
necessary to prevent the employer from 
becoming a general insurer. They argue 
that without the unusual exertion rule, em-
ployment opportunities for persons with a 
history or indication of physical disability 
or handicap will be reduced. 
Despite precedent supporting the "un-
usual exertion" rule, the claimant urges us 
to follow a separate line of authority that 
awards compensation for injuries that oc-
cur during usual and ordinary workplace 
activity. These cases typically award com-
pensation where the claimant was engaged 
in a workplace activity and where there is 
adequate evidence of medica1 causation. 
See, e.g., Kaiser St^el Corp. o. Monfredi, 
631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) (award for com-
pensation affirmed for a coal miner's back 
injury despite absence of unusual incident); 
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 
P.2d at 695 (compensation awarded for 
Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 592, 319 N.W.2d 454, 458 
(1982). 
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back injuries arising from ordinary duties 
upon proof of medical causal connection 
between workplace exertions and the inju-
ry); Residential and Commercial Con-
struction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) (carpenter's back 
injury from lifting, bending, and twisting in 
the ordinary course of work compensable); 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740, 742 (1967) 
(awarding compensation to fireman for ex-
ertions in the normal course of employ-
ment—the Court rejecting the unusual ex-
ertion test in favor of ordinary exertion); 
Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 
2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury 
from filing papers in lower drawer of cabi-
net compensable); Purity Biscuit Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 
P.2d 961 (1949). Although the usual exer-
tion rule was questioned in Mellen v. In-
dustrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d at 375-
/»•• 431 P.2d at 800, that decision failed to 
explicitly overrule the usual exertion line of 
cases. Moreover, Residential and Com-
mercial Construction Co., Schmidt, and 
Kaiser Steel have awarded compensation 
for usual workplace activity after the Mel-
len decision. Clearly, the usual exertion 
rule is not simply an aberration in Utah 
law. 
When read in chronological sequence, 
our opinions demonstrate an inconsistent 
and confused approach to determining 
when an accident arose out of or in the 
course of employment. Much of this con-
fusion can be traced to fundamental prob-
lems stemming from the use of the usual-
unusual distinction as a means of provin { 
causation. Larson criticizes the unusual 
exertion requirement by itself as a "clumsy 
and ill-fitting device with which to ensure 
causal connection." Larson, supra, § 38.-
81, at 7-270. The problems in determining 
what activities were usual or unusual were 
6. Larson's observation is consistent with this 
Court's rationale for rejecting the unusual exer-
tion requirement in Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 
16, 201 P.2d at 968: 
[I]f [overexertion] is the test no one will ever 
know what this court will consider sufficient 
overexertion. Also under that test if the work 
recognized as long ago as 1949 when Jus-
tice Wolfe wrote that a "Pandora's box of 
difficulties . . . may be opened by the re-
finements between « sual and unusual, ex-
ertion and overexertion, ordinary and ex-
traordinary exertion measured by the indi-
vidual involved or by the industrial func-
tion performed by him or both." Purity 
Biscuit, 115 Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially). The con-
tents of the Pandora's box feared by Jus-
tice Wolfe are now evident in the plethora 
of our cases struggling with a definition of 
a compensable accident based upon the 
usualness or ordinariness of an activity. 
Professor Larson has also criticized the 
usual-unusual distinction because the ordi-
nariness of the activity fails to consider 
that some occupations routinely require a 
usual exertion capable of causing mjury. 
Likewise, other occuTalons, such as desk-
work, require c/> little physical effor «] at 
an "unusual exertion" may be insufficient 
to prove that the resulting accident arose 
out of the employment. Larson, supra, 
§ 38.81, at 7-270.6 
[5] Because we find the present use of 
the usual-unusual distinction unhelpful and 
our prior precedent inconsistent, we take 
this opportunity to examine an alternative 
causation analysis that may better meet 
the objectives of the workers' compensa-
tion laws. We are mindful that the key 
question in determining causation is wheth-
er, given this body and this exertion, the 
exertion in fact contributed to the injury. 
Id. § 38.82, at 7-271; Purity Biscuit, 115 
Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe, J., 
concurring specially). 
[6] The language Arising out of or in 
the course of his employment" found in 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986), was 
apparently intended to ensure that compen-
sation is only awarded where there is a 
usually required by the job is so great that it 
would break the strongest man even he will 
not be able to recover. But if it is more than 
usual exertion which causes the injury the 
employee can recover no matter how light the 
work is which causes the injury. 
Id. 
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sufficient causal connection between the 
disability and the working conditions. The 
causation requirement makes it necessary 
to distinguish those injuries which (a) coin-
cidentaily occur at irjrk because a preexist-
ing condition results in symptoms which 
appear during work hours without any en-
hancement from the workplace, and (b) 
those injuries which occur because some 
condition or exertion required by the em-
ployment increases the risk of injury which 
the worker normally faces in his everyday 
life. See Bryant v. Masters Machine Co., 
444* A.2d 32b, 337 (Me.1982). Only the 
latter type of injury is compensable under 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45. Tbere is no fixed 
formula by which the causation issue may 
be resolved, and the issue must be deter-
mined on the facts of each case. 
[7] Professor Larson has suggested a 
two-part causation test which is coi sis tent 
with the purpose of car workers' compen-
sation laws ar.l helpful in determining cau-
sation. We therefore adopt that test. Lar-
son suggests that compensable injuries can 
best be identified by first considering the 
legal cause of the injury and then its medi-
cal cause. Larson, supra, § 38.83(a), at 
7-273. "Under the legal test, the law must 
define what kind of exertion satisfies the 
test of 'arising out of the employment' . . . 
[then] the doctors must say whether the 
exertion (having been held legally suffi-
cient to support compensation) in fact 
7. Cases from other jurisdictions which have ac-
cepted the dual-causation standard suggested by 
Larson include: Market Foods Distribs., Inc. v. 
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) 
(claimant with preexisting spinal disease denied 
compensation where injury could have been 
triggered at any time during normal movement 
and exertion at work ~"»t greater than typical 
nonemployment exertio^;; Guidry v. Sline In-
dus. Painters, Inc., 418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982) 
(claimant granted compensation where injury 
resulted from stress, exertion, and strain greater 
than that in everyday nonemployment life); 
Bryant v. Masters Mack Co., 444 A.2d 329 (Me. 
1982) (claimant with preexisting condition 
awarded compensation for back injury resulting 
from fall from his stool at work because of 
increased risk of falling where employees 
moved around him at work); Barrett v. Herbert 
Eng'g, Inc., 371 A.2d 633 (Me.1977) (claimant 
with preexisting back condition denied compen-
;TRIAL COM'N Utah 25 
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caused this [injury]."7 Larson, supra, 
§ 38.83(a), at 7-276 to -277. 
[8] 1. Legal Cause—Whether an inju-
ry arose oirr of or in the course of employ-
ment is difficult to determine where the 
employee brings to the workplace a person-
al element of risk such as a preexisting 
condition. Just because a person suffers a 
preexisting condition, he or she is not dis-
qualified from obtaining compensation. 
Our cases make clear that "the aggrava-
tion or lighting up of a pre-existing disease 
by an industrial accident is compensa-
ble " Powers v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 19 Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 
743 (1967) (footnote omitted). To meet the 
legal causation requirement, a claimant 
with a preexisting condition must show 
that the employment contributed some-
thing substantial to increase the risk he 
already face'* in everyday life because of 
his condition. This additior^J element of 
risk in the workplace is usually supplied by 
an exertion greater than that undertaken in 
normal, everyday life. This extra exertion 
serves to offset the preexisting condition of 
the employee as a likely cause of the inju-
ry, thereby eliminating claims for impair-
ments resulting from a personal risk rather 
than exertions at work. Larson, supra, 
§ 38.83(b), at 7-278. Larson summarized 
how the legal cause rule would work in 
practice as follows: 
sation for injury resulting from working at nor-
mal gait since there was no work-related en-
hancement of personal risk); Mann v. City of 
Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 319 N.W.2d &Z4 (1982) 
(policeman with history of heart di.« t ase award-
ed compensation for heart attach at home 
where claimant's physician testified that attack 
was caused b^ stress of police work rather than 
personal risk lactors); Sellens v. Allen Prods. 
Co., 206 Neb. 506, 293 N.W.2d 415 (1980) 
(claimant with preexisting heart problems de-
nied compensation for heart attack suffered 
while unloading 28-pound cases from truck 
trailer despite sedentary non working lifestyle 
using objective standard of average worker in 
nonemployment life); Couture v. Mammoth 
Groceries, Inc., 116 N.H. 181, 355 A.2d 421 
(1976) (claimant with no preexisting heart prob-
lems awarded benefits upon proof that lifting 
btwf medically caused the fatal heart attack). 
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If there is some personal causal contri-
bution in the form of a [preexisting con-
dition], the employment contribution 
must take thj form of an exertion great-
er than that of nonemployment life 
If there is no personal causal contribu-
tion, that is, if there is no prior weakness 
or disease, any exertion connected with 
the employment and causally connected 
with the [injury] as a matter of medical 
fact is adequate to satisfy the legal test 
of causation. 
Id. Thus, where the claimant suffers from 
a preexisting condition which contributes to 
the injury, an unusual or extraordinary ex-
ertion is required to prove legal causation. 
Where there is no preexisting condition, a 
usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient.8 
[9] We also accept Larson's suggestion 
that the comparison between the usua} and 
unusual exertion be defined according to an 
objective standard. "Note that the com-
parison •> not with this employee's usual 
exertion in his employ w^J, but with the 
ex^itions of normal noneiaployment life of 
this or any other person." Larson, supra, 
§ 38.83(b), at 7-279 (emphasis in original). 
See also Johns-Manville Products v. In-
dustrial Commission, 78 111.2d 171, 178, 35 
Ill.Dec. 540, 544, 399 N.E.2d 606, 610 (1979) 
(compensation denied where the risk of the 
employment activity "is no greater than 
that to which he would have been exposed 
had he not been so employed"); Strickland 
8. Larson highlights the difference between the 
unusual-usual exertion test with the rule we 
today adopt with the following examples of ex-
treme cases in the heart attack area: 
Suppose X's job involves frequent lifting of 
200--pound bags, and one such 200-pound lift 
medically produces a heart attack. Under the 
old 'jnusual-exertion rule there would be no 
c o n v e n s a u o n » regardless of pievious heart 
conditio . Under the suggested .^le there 
would be compensation, even in the presence 
of a history of heart disease, because people 
generally do not lift 200-pound weights as a 
part of nonemployment life, and therefore 
this episode cannot be ascribed to the ordi-
nary wear and tear of life. 
Suppose Y's job involves no lifting. Sup-
pose he lifts a 20-pound weight on the job, 
and suppose there is medical testimony that 
this lift caused his heart attack. Under the 
old test, exclusively concerned with the com-
v. National Gypsum Co., 348 So.2d 497, 
499 (Ala.Civ.App.1977) (employment risk 
must be " 'a danger or risk materially in 
excess of that to which people not so em-
ployed are exposed ' " Quoting from 
City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App. 
701, 705-06, 318 So.2d 729, 732 (1975)). 
But see Market Foods Distributors, Inc. v. 
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726, 727 (Fla.Dist.Ct. 
App.1980) (subjective test: "the employ-
ment must involve an exertion greater than 
that normally performed by the employee 
during his non-employment life"). Thus, 
the precipitating exertion must be com-
pared with the usual wear and tear and 
exertions of nonemployment life, not the 
nonemployment life of the particular work-
er. 
We believe an objective standard of com-
parison wm provide a more consistent and 
predictable standard for the Commission 
and this Court to follow. In evalurting 
typical nonemployment activity, the focus 
is r^ what typical nonemployment activ. ..s 
are generally expected of people in today's 
society, not what this particular claimant is 
accustomed to doing. Typical activities 
and exertions expected of men and women 
in the latter part of the 20th century, for 
example, include taking full garbage cans 
to the street, lifting and carrying baggage 
for travel, changing a flat tire on an auto-
mobile, lifting a small child to chest height, 
and climbing the stairs in buildings. By 
parison between this employee's usual exer-
tions and the precipitating exertion, there 
would be compensation. Under the suggested 
rule the result would depend on whether 
there was a personal causal element in the 
form of a previouciy weakened heart. If 
there was not, comrrnsation would be award-
ed, since the employment contributed some-
thing and the employee's personal life nothing 
to the cause of the collapse. If there was [a 
previously weakened heart], compensation 
would be denied in spite of the medical causal 
contribution, because legally the personal 
causal contribution was substantial, while the 
employment added nothing to the usual wear 
and tear of life—which certainly includes lift-
ing objects weighing 20 pounds such as bags 
of golf clubs, minnow pails, and step ladders. 
Larson, supra, § 38.83, at 7-280-81 (footnote 
omitted). 
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using an objective standard, the case law 
will eventually define a standard for typical 
"nonemployment activity" in much the way 
case law has developed the standard of 
care for the reasonable man in tort law. 
[10] 2. Mtdical Cause—The second 
part of Larson's dual-causation test re-
quires that the claimant prove the disability 
is medically the result of an exertion or 
injury that occurred during a work-related 
activity. The purpose of the medical cause 
test is to ensure that there is a medically 
demonstrable causal link between the 
work-related exertions and the unexpected 
injuries that resulted from those strains. 
The medical causal requirement will pre-
vent an employer from becoming a general 
insurer of his employees and discourage 
fraudulent claims. 
With the issue being one primarily of 
causation, the importance of the . . . 
medical panel becomes manifest. It is 
through the p'ipertise of the medical pan-
el that the Commission should be able to 
make rae determination of vhether the 
injury sustained by a claimant is causally 
connected or contributed to by the claim-
ant's employment. 
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697 (Wilkins, J., con-
curring). Under the medical cause test, the 
claimant must show by evidence, opinion, 
or otherwise that the stress, strain, or exer-
tion required by his or her occupation led to 
the resulting injury or disability. In the 
event the claimant cannot show a medical 
causal connection, compensation should be 
denied.9 
III. 
[11] We now undertake to ctpply the 
foregoing analysis to the cas*- before us. 
In reviewing findings of fact of the Indus-
trial Commission, we determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's findings. Champion Home 
9. Evidence of the ordinariness or usualness of 
the employee's exertions may be relevant to the 
medical conclusion of causal connection. 
Where the injury results from latent symptoms 
with an illness such as heart disease, proof of 
medical causation may be especially difficult. 
Larson's treatise cites many examples of cases 
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Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 
P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1985). 
[12] We have previously stated that the 
key element of whether an injury occurred 
"by accident" is whether the injury was 
unexpected. After reviewing the record, 
we find no substantial evidence that the 
injury was not unexpected. It is clear 
from the uncontradicted testimony of the 
claimant that he experienced an unexpected 
and unanticipated injury to his back as he 
lifted a crate of milk in the cramped area of 
the cooler. Although the claimant had in-
jured his back on prior jobs, he had not 
complained of pain or limitations at his job 
with Kent's Foods. There is no evidence 
which indicates that this injury was predict-
able or that it developed gradually as with 
an occupational disease or progressive back 
disorder. While the employer's report of 
injury and the medical records do not cor-
roborate that a sudden and identifiable in-
jury occurr^ in the coole/, the reports are 
unhelpful in determining whether the inju-
ry v,"~ unexpected. 
It appears that the administrative law 
judge applied the "unusual event or trau-
ma" rule in defining an accident. We have 
rejected that test in lieu of a test based on 
unexpectedness. Moreover, the adminis-
trative law judge's emphasis on prior inju-
ries is not determinative of whether an 
accident occurred. We have previously 
held that the aggravation or "lighting up" 
of a preexisting condition by an internal 
failure is a compensable accident. Powers 
v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 
143, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). We conclude 
therefore that the decision of the Commis-
sion that the claimant's injury was not "by 
accident" was not based on the evidence, 
and that decision is, therefore, erroneous. 
[13] The key issue in this case, like 
most internal failure cases, is whether the 
injury "arose out of or in the course of 
where compensation claims were defeated be-
cause of inadequate proof of medico1 causation. 
See Larson, supra, § 38.83(1), at 7-319 to -321. 
Compare Guidry v. Sline Indus Painters, Inc., 
418 So.2d 626 (La.1982) (heart attack triggered 
by stress, exertion, and strain greater than sed-
entary life of average worker compensable). 
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employment." Since the claimant had pre-
vious back problems, to meet the legal cau-
sation requirement he must show that mov-
ing and lifting several piles of dairy prod-
ucts weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the 
confined area of the cooler exceeded the 
exertion that the average person typically 
undertakes in nonemployment life. The ev-
idence presented by the claimant was insuf-
ficient for us to make a determination re-
garding legal causation. It is unclear from 
the record how many crates were moved by 
the claimant, the distance the crates were 
moved, the precise weight of the crates, 
and the size of the area in which the lifting 
and moving took place. Because the claim-
ant did not have the benefit of the fore-
going opinion, we remand for further fact-
finding on this issue. 
Moreover, the record is insufficient to 
show medical causation. It is unclear from 
the medical reports whether the doctors 
were aware of the specific incident in the 
cooler. Further, the case was not sub-
mitted to a medical panel for its evaluation. 
Without sufficient evidence of medical cau-
sation, we are unable to determine whether 
there is a medically demonstrable causal 
link between the lift in the cooler and the 
injury to the claimant's back. We there-
fore remand to the Industrial Commission 
for additional evidence and findings on the 
question of medical causation. 
The decision of the Commission is vacat-
ed and remanded. 
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring and 
dissenting). 
I concur in remanding this case tc the 
Commission for the purpose of determining 
1. Powers v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 140, 
143^44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). 
2. 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). 
3. Emery Mining Corp. v. DeFriez, 694 P.2d 606 
(Utah 1984); Giles v. Industrial Comm'n, 692 
P.2d 743 (Utah 1984); Fnto-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 
689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984); Billings Computer 
Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983); 
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 
1982); Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(Utah 1981); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Ma-
whether the work incident aggravated a 
preexisting condition sue], as would war-
rant an award of compensation.1 However, 
I do not join the Court in adopting an 
"unexpected resuV standard to be applied 
in determining the existence of a compensa-
ble accident. 
I do not believe that this Court has "mis-
construed the historical and logical" defini-
tion of "by accident" in the bulk of its 
recent cases concerning the issue at bar. 
The majority's reliance upon Purity Bis-
cuit Co. \ Industrial Commission2 is 
misplaced. The holding therein is without 
precedential value because it has been sim-
ply ignored.3 The only case in which this 
Court followed Purity Biscuit is Schmidt 
v. Industrial Commission, 4 which support 
is similarly without precedential value be-
cause it has also been ignored beginning 
with Painter Motor Co. v. Ostler,'-' the very 
next accident case handed down. In that 
case, the Court cited and relied upon Car-
ling v. Industrial Commission 6 and again 
defined "accident" as an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from what 
would normally be expected to occur in the 
usual course of events. In my view, Puri-
ty Biscuit and Schmidt emerge as aberra-
tions in our post-war case law. 
The majority opinion holds that hence-
forth an injury by accident "is an unex-
pected or unintended occurrence that may 
be either the cause or the result of an 
injury." (Emphasis in original.) However, 
the legislature, whose prerogative it is to 
establish policy, has chosen wording which 
precludes such an interpretation. The rea-
soning of Justice Latimer's dissent in Puri-
son, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980); Church of Jesus 
Christ of iMtter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 
590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979); Redman Warehousing 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 
P.2d 283 (1969); Carling v. Industrial Comm'n, 
16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). 
4. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980). 
5. 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980). 
6. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). 
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ty Biscuit illustrates the shortcomings of 
the majority's interpretation. The word 
"accident," when viewed in isolation, may 
be used to denote both an unexpected oc-
currence which produces injury as well as 
an unexpected injury. The word "injury," 
on the other hand, denotes a result and not 
a cause. Had the legislature only used the 
word "injury" in section 35-1-45 (U.C.A., 
1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B, 1974 ed., 
Supp.1986)), then that statute would cover 
all results regardless of the cause. Had 
the legislature only used the word "acci-
dent," then I would agree with the majori-
ty's holding today that the legislature in-
tended to cov^r both the cause and the 
result. In fact, however, the legislature 
has used both words "injury" and "acci-
dent." It follows that the word "accident" 
must be interpreted as focusing upon the 
cause and not the result. In short, the 
majority's interpretation writes the word 
"injury" out of the statute. Such ? deci-
sion is unwarranted in \iy view. 
The legislature vecently amended se^f,\n 
35-1-45,7 but chose to leave intact the stan-
dard which limits the payment of compen-
sation to those injured "by accident arising 
out of or in the course of . . . employ-
ment." 8 Moreover, the singular "injury by 
accident" standard has not been altered or 
amended since its inception in 1917,9 The 
legislature thus being satisfied with the 
Court's interpretation of the term "acci-
dent" in the long line of cases beginning 
with Carting v. Industrial Commission™ 
I decline to embark upon a new effort to 
redefine that term. 
STEWART, Justice: (dissenting). 
I dissent. The majority defines the stat-
utory term "accident" to mean "unex-
pected result," regardk"* of whether it is 
produced by a usual or an unusual event. 
The majority also defines the term "arising 
out of or m the course of employment" to 
7. Act of Jan. 27, 1984, ch. 75, § 1, 1984 Utah 
Laws 610, 610. 
8. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (RepI.Vol. 4B, 1974 
ed., Supp.1986). 
STRIAL COM'N Utah 29 
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impose legal and medical causation require-
ments. See U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45. 
Curiously, the requirement of "legal cau-
sation" has two different meanings, de-
pending upon the physical condition of the 
worker at the time he is injured. A worker 
having no preexisting medical condition or 
handicap need only prove that the accident 
was caused by a "usual or ordinary exer-
tion." But for congenitally handicapped 
persons and for persons who have suffered 
preexisting industrial injuries (which pre-
sumably have left the worker with some 
physical weakness or deterioration), legal 
causation has a different meaning. Such a 
worker may receive compensation only if 
the "employment contribution" to the inter-
nal breakdown is "greater than that of 
nonemployment life." According to the 
majority, such a worker must now prove 
that his internal breakdown was caused by 
"an unusual or extraordinary exertion" 
in order to establish the requisite legal 
causation, even though the majority opin-
ion itself criticizes at length the "usual-tm-. 
usual Qiotinction as a means of proving 
causation." How the majority can reject 
that standard for persons having no preex-
isting condition, yet embrace that standard 
for persons with preexisting conditions, is 
baffling. 
Furthermore, the difference between the 
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" which 
a worker with a preexisting condition must 
demonstrate and the "usual exertion" 
which a person with no preexisting condi-
tion must demonstrate is far from clear. 
The latter standard is to be judged with 
respect to the " 'normal nonemployment 
life of this or any other person.' " The 
Court emphasizes that the "precj jitating 
exertion must be compared with the usual 
wear and tear and exertions of nonem-
ployment life, not the nonemployment life 
of the particular worker," What the term 
"usual wear and tear and exertions of non-
employment" means is not defined by the 
9. Act of March 18, 1917, ch. 100, § 52a, 1917 
Utah Laws 306, 322-23. 
10. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). 
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majority. The few examples set out do 
little to explain the concept aimed at, other 
than to suggest that the term means some-
thing more than simple, life-sustaining ac-
tivities. 
I when/ fail to understand why persons 
who have a preexisting condition should be 
placed in the disadvantaged position, in-
deed the near-remediless position, that the 
majority opinion imposes upon them. The 
purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to 
provide compensation for workers who 
have preexisting medical conditions and 
therefore run a greater risk of injury when 
tluy expose themselves to the hazards of 
the work place. But the law should en-
courage such persons to work rather than 
encouraging them to abandon the work 
force for some kind of unearned support. 
This Court has repeatedly stated that the 
Second Injury Fund was designed to en-
courage employers to hire persons with 
pr^existin/ condition by spreading the 
risk throughout the indust* \ to assure "<uch 
peiv-uiis that their injuries will be carea for 
without imposing extraordinary liabilities 
on the employers who hire them. Inter-
mountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 
610 P.2d 334, 337 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. 
United States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504, 
505 (Utah 1976). Society certainly ought to 
favor those policies which encourage peo-
ple to work, rather than policies that deter 
employers from offering gainful employ-
ment to those who have a higher risk of 
work-related injury. There is little person-
al or social benefit from a policy that tends 
to discourage persons from working be-
cause of prior injuries or disabilities. 
Further, it is fundamentally unfair and 
flatly inconsistent with the basic purposes 
of the workmen's compensation laws to 
impose higher standards for compensation 
on those with preexisting medical condi-
tions than on those without. Tort law gen-
erally does not do so. A defendant in a 
negligence action is required to take the 
victim as the defendant finds him; whatev-
er unusual vulnerabilities the victim may 
have are disregarded. That principle 
should not be, and until now has not been, 
different in workmen's compensation law, 
which is really a substitute for tort law 
remedies. In short, handicapped or previ-
ously injured persons who are injured by 
an industrial accident are simply discrimi-
nated against by having to meet the majori-
ty's rigorous legal cause requirement. 
I am also unable to understand how an 
administrative law judge, the Industrial 
Commission, or an appellate court is sup-
posed to determine what "typical nonem-
ployment activities" are "in today's socie-
ty," as they now must do for the purpose 
of determining legal causation for workers 
with preexisting medical conditions. Does 
that mean what a typical sixty-five-year-old 
does or a typical twenty-one-year-old does 
during his or her nonemployment activi-
ties? Is it what a professional football 
player does in his leisure time or what a 
ballet dancer does? Is it what a sedentary 
worker does in his or her off-hours or what 
a forest ranger does? 
Instead of defining a meaningful stan-
dard, the majority provides examples which 
supposedly illustrate the unarticulated 
principle. The examples "include taking 
full garbage cans to the street, lifting and 
carrying baggage for travel, changing a 
flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small 
child to chest height, and climbing the 
stairs in buildings." These few examples, 
which I find to be arguable in any event 
since they reflect only what some people 
may do from time to time, do not substitute 
for a legal standard. I seriously wonder 
whether changing a flat tire on an automo-
bile is a typical activity in today's society, 
and I do not know how much luggage the 
"typical" individual li ..s or how far he or 
she carries it. The point is that the majori-
ty has not set forth a workable standard at 
all. In fact, I have serious doubt that such 
an artificial construct as "typical nonem-
ployment activities" will produce more fair 
and rational decisions than our past cases. 
The majority simply assumes a "typical'' 
individual for the purpose of establishing a 
rational standard. Unfortunately, disabili-
ties happen to real people, not to "average" 
people, and the law has always recognized 
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as much. In short, I do not think that the 
majority's newly established standard will 
produce decisions one whit more consistent 
or rational than those produced in the 
past.1 
The majority also holds that an injured 
person must prove that the disability is 
"medically the result of an exertion or inju-
ry that occurred during a work-related ac-
tivity." With a degree of hope that I think 
is unwarranted, the majority states that 
"[t]he medical causal requirement will pre-
vent an employer from becoming a general 
insurer of his employees and discourage 
fraudulent claims/' I am fearful that that 
hope is seriously misplaced. 
Certainly Professor Larson, largely the 
source of the Court's new standards and 
analysis, is highly acclaimed in this field of 
law, but there is much to be said for the 
case-by-case approach in hammering out 
legal doctrine, even if it does :>n occasion 
produce inconsistencies, I readily concede 
that pre^jnt law needs to be rationalized 
* '1 that some cases sh • Id be overruled 
because they are hopelessly inconsistent 
with other cases, but I do not believe that 
the law needs to be revolutionized in such a 
manner as to defeat those humane policies 
intended to allow for the injuiies of work-
ers who come to the work place in an 
impaired condition. 
I also join the Chief Justice's dissent. 
1. In my view, the decisions of this Court are 
generally reconcilable with only a few glaring 
exceptions and most of them piior to 1980. 
That there are more inconsistencies the further 
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Richard E. HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the 
STATE OF UTAH, Ricnard E. Hollo-
way Trucking [Employer], and the 
State Insurance fund [Insurance carri-
er for the Employer], Defendants. 
No. 20621. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 21, 1986. 
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., James R. 
Black, Mary A. Rudolph, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff Richard E Holloway is a self-
employed truck driver. On July 11, 1984, 
after driving for about six hcurs he 
stopped at a rest stop. He claims that he 
slipped while '"diking aerosF cJi J l ' ; , : ",u 
his way to the restroom and that the slip 
caused him to jerk to regain his balance. Af-
ter returning from the restroom, Holloway 
bent over to inspect one of his truck tires. 
While crouching, he experienced an imme-
diate sharp pain in his back which made 
him fall to the ground, landing on his arms 
and jaw. His wife, also a truck driver, 
drove for the rest of the trip. Two days 
after the incident Holloway consulted a chi-
ropractor in Georgia. He consulted anoth-
er chiropractor on returning to Salt Lake 
City. The slip on the oil spill was not 
mentioned in the reports of the chiropractors 
who examined Holloway, in the First Re-
port of Injury, or in the claimant's report 
of how the injury occurred. 
The Commission u aied review of the 
administrative law judge's order. The 
judge ruled that the plaintiffs injury was 
not the result of an "accident" as that term 
back one goes in our body of law *s not particu-
larly unexpected. In any event, I doubt that the 
new approach will produce unwavering consist-
ency over the years. 
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is used under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. 
This case is controlled by Allen v. Indus-
trial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986), which establishes new standards for 
determining whether an "accident" oc-
curred in internal breakdown cases, such as 
the instant case. We therefore reverse and 
remand to the Commission for reconsidera-
tion in light of Allen. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring): 
I agree that this matter must be recon-
sidered by the Industrial Commission, since 
the administrative law judge obviously con-
sidered recovery precluded by the "acci-
dent" standard set forth in Sabo's Elec-
tronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 
1982), and BAlings Computer Corp. v. 
Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983), cases 
subsequent/ rejected by this Court's deci-
sion in Allen v. Industrie Commission, 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). However, I 
would add a few comments for the benefit 
of the Commission on remand. 
First, from the administrative law 
judge's findings, it is clear that he con-
sidered the injury to be the unexpected 
result of fatigue and strain incurred in the 
course of employment. This is enough un-
der Allen to support a finding that the 
injury occurred "by accident/' 
Second, the administrative law judge's 
findings also suggest that he considered 
medical causation to have been established, 
i.e., there was a physiological causal link-
age between the injury ^nd the job activi-
ties. Therefore, the OR1/ remaining ques-
tion appears to be whether legal causation 
has been shown. 
Third, with respect to legal causation, 
the facts indicate that under Allen, Hollo-
way wou1! be entitled to recover unless he 
brought to the job a preexisting condition 
that contributed to his injuries. If he did 
1 a /e such a preexisting injury, he would 
have to show that the job-related injuries 
were the product of "unusual or extraordi-
nary exertion." Allen v. Industrial Com-
mission, at 25-26. The record is si-
lent as to whether Holloway had a preexist-
ing condition. 
With respect to the focus of this case on 
remand—whether Holloway had a preexist-
ing condition—I would observe that the 
preexisting condition of which Allen 
speaks need not be patent; in fact, it need 
not have been known or knowable to any-
one before the injury. The sole question is 
whether the worker came to the workplace 
with a condition that increased his risk of 
injury. If he did rnd that condition contrib-
ute,! oO the injury, then Allen's higher stan-
dard of legal causa *'% comes into play ;c 
as to place that worker on the same footing 
as one who did not come to work with a 
preexisting condition. See id., at 25-
26. To rule otherwise would create the 
strong likelihood that a worker who has a 
preexisting condition and whose virtually 
inevitable injury simply happens to occur at 
work will be able to foist the cost of that 
injury on his employer when the workplace 
had little to do with causing the injury. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the concurring 
opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J. 
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step in deciding whether any defendant is 
justified ^nder section 7G-2-405 is to deter-
mine what burden of proof the defendant 
°nd the State are respectively required to 
carry. It is impossible to allocate the bur-
den of proof without first determining 
whether the defendant is entitled to the 
statutory presumption. 
In view of the foregoing, we vacate the 
trial court's finding of delinquency and re-
mand this case for factual findings as to 
whether the entry into R.J.Z.'s home was 
unlawful and forcible, or otherwise quali-
fies under U.C.A., 1953, § 76-2-405(2) for a 
legal presumption of reasonableness, and a 
new determination regarding jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court based on such findings. 
HALL, C.J., STEWART, Associate 
C.J., and HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, 
V, concur. 
JT^ , 
( O \ KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
James LANCASTER, Plaintiff, 
v. 
GILBERT DEVELOPMENT, State 
Insurance Fund, and the Second 
Injury Fund, Defendants. 
No. 20897. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 20, 1987. 
Workers' compensation benefits for 
heart attack that occurred while claimant 
was at work were denied by the Industrial 
Commission, and claimant sought review. 
The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: 
(1) heart attack was by "accident," but (2) 
conclusion that there was no medical causal 
connection between work conditions and 
the heart attack was neither arbitrary or 
of section 78-3a-16). The findings we are re-
quiring in this opinion are not jurisdictional 
findings, but rather findings relating to the ap-
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capricious nor without substantial evidence 
to support it. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, Associate C.J., concurs , in 
the result. 
1. Workers' Compensation <§=»571 
Heart attack was by "accident" for 
workers' compensation purposes where 
there was nothing in claimant's job duties 
to suggest he would suffer a heart attack, 
nor did he anticipate one, so that it was 
"unexpected/' U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Workers' Compensation <3=>1536 
Conclusion of Industrial Commission 
that there was no medical causal connec-
tion between claimant's work conditio is, 
during cold weather at high altitude, and 
his heart attack, was neither i^uitrary or 
capricious nor without substantial evidence 
to support it, in light of conflicting medical 
evidence and facts that claimant was work-
ing in a heated backhoe cab, using hydrau-
lically operated controls. U.C.A.1953, 35-
1-45. 
Michael E. Dyer, Stephanie A. Mallory, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Dennis Lloyd, Susan B. Diana, Salt Lake 
City, for State Ins. Fund. 
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for 
Second Injury Fund. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The claimant, James Lancaster, seel N re-
view of the denial of workers' compensa-
tion benefits by the State Industrial Com-
mission for injuries from a heart attack 
that occurred while he was clearing snow 
with a backhoe at Brian Head Ski Resort. 
We examine the evidence on this writ of 
review to determine if the claimant's heart 
attack is the result of an injury "by acci-
phcation of an affirmative defense to criminal 
charges. 
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dent arising out of or in the course of his 
employment." U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 
(Supp.1986). We recently established the 
analytical framework for internal injury 
cases such as this in Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Us-
ing the dialysis in Alien, we affirm the 
decision of the Industrial Commission. 
On February 17, 1984, the claimant, aged 
43, arrived for work at Brian Head Resort 
at his usual hour of 7:00 a.m. The eleva-
tion at Brian Head Resort is approximately 
ten thousand feet. Claimant's first task 
was to clear snow using a backhoe. Al-
though the temperature outside was cold, 
the cab of the backhoe was heated. All of 
the backhoe controls were hydraulically op-
erated and required no unusual effort to 
operate. During the morning's work, the 
claimant climbed in and out of the backhoe 
two or three times. 
The claimant experienced chest pains, 
which bee. * e more severe as the day pro-
grenccd. These pains weit more severe 
than similar pains he had experienced four 
days earlier. When the pains became debil-
itating, he informed his supervisor, who 
then called paramedics; the claimant was 
transported to a hospital in Cedar City, 
Utah. The treating physician determined 
that the claimant was suffering from acute 
anterior myocardial infarction. After one 
week at the hospital, the claimant was re-
leased to the care of his personal physician, 
Dr. Chanderraj. Although this was the 
claimant's first heart attack, he had several 
preexisting risk factors that predisposed 
him to heart attacks: a twenty-year smok-
ing history, an elevated serum cholesterol 
level, an elevated uric acid level, and bor-
derline diabetes. 
On Augx *» 10, 1984, the Industrial Com-
mission held a hearing in which one doctor, 
Dr. Perry, was appointed to a medical pan-
el. A hearing on the medical panel find-
ings was held on March 25, 1985. On April 
5, 1985, the administrative law judge issued 
his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
order. The administrative law judge re-
viewed the conflicting medical evidence and 
then adopted the medical findings of the 
medical panel as his own. The administra-
tive law judge found: 
[T]he Applicant's work activities and the 
myocardial infarction of [February 17, 
1984] do not constitute an injury by acci-
dent. The Applicant's heart attack was 
unexpected, but there was nothing about 
his work activities that could constitute 
an unanticipated, unintended occurrence 
different from what would normally be 
expected to occur in the usual course of 
events. His heart attack appears to have 
been a mere coincidence, and his work 
activities did not contribute significantly 
to its occurrence. At best, it is conjectu-
ral as to whether it even precipitated his 
heart attack, but it clearly was not a 
significant precipitating cause. There 
was no evidence that the Applicant's 
work activities on February 17, 1984 
were particularly different from the ac-
tivities he had been performing for many 
weeks prior thereto. 
The administrative law judgs ultimately de\ 
nied the claim on the ground that the clair -
ant failed to show that the heart attack 
was "by accident" and that the heart at-
tack was medically caused by an exertion 
in the workplace. 
Our scope of review of factual findings 
in Industrial Commission cases is limited. 
We have explained in prior cases: 
The reviewing court's inquiry is whether 
the Commission's findings are "arbitrary 
and capricious" or "wholly without 
cause" or contrary to the "one [inev-
itable] conclusion from the evidence" or 
without "any substantial evidence" to 
support them. Only then should the 
Commission's findings be displaced. 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v Monfredi, 631 P.2d 
888, 890 (Utah 1981) {quoted in Pittsburgh 
Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 
1367, 1370 (Utah 1983), and Sabo's Elec-
tronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722, 725 
(Utah 1982)). At the time of his decision, 
the administrative law judge did not have 
the benefit of our analytical framework for 
accident cases involving internal failures 
set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Neverthe-
less, the record is sufficiently developed for 
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us to apply Allen to the facts and conclu-
sions in the case before us. 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, we 
explained that the Utah Workers' Compen-
sation Act, section 35-1-45, requires proof 
that an injury occurred "by accident" and 
proof of a causal connection between the 
accident and the activities or exertions re-
quired in the workplace. 729 P.2d at 18. 
The administrative law judge's ruling 
shows that he found the evidence insuffi-
cient to meet both the accident and the 
causation elements. 
In Allen, we embraced the definition of 
"by accident" first formulated in Purity 
Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 
Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). We rejected 
the position that an accident requires an 
unusual event or occurrence. 729 P.2d at 
20. An ordinary or usual exertion is suffi-
cient to meet the "by accident" definition if 
"the result of an exertion was different 
from what would normally be expected to 
occur, the occurrence was unplanned, un-
foreseen, unintended a * therefore by acci-
dent." 729 P.2H i t 22. The critical factor 
when determining whether an incident is 
by accident is unexpectedness. 729 P.2d at 
22. 
[1] Despite a finding that the heart at-
tack was unexpected, the administrative 
law judge concluded there was no accident 
primarily because the claimant was under-
taking his usual work duties. That conclu-
sion cannot stand in light of the standard 
set forth in Allen. Although the claimant 
had experienced similar pains four days 
earlier, he had not been advised of the 
etiology of those pains and he had no fore-
warning that they would occur again on 
February 17. Moreover, there is nothing in 
the claimant's job duties to suggest that he 
would suffer a heart attack. There is over-
whelming evidence t*--»t the claimant did 
not intend to have a heart attack, nor did 
he anticipate one. These factors, taken 
together with the finding that the myocar-
dial infarction was the "unexpected" result 
of an exertion in the workplace, require the 
conclusion that the heart attack was "by 
accident." 
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The next step requires us to analyze the 
causal connection between the heart attack 
and the working conditions. See Hone v. 
Shea, 728 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Utah 1986). We 
adopted Professor Larson's two-step causa-
tion analysis in Allen v. Industrial Com-
mission. 729 P.2d at 25. In order to meet 
the causation requirement, there must be 
sufficient evidence of legal cause and medi-
cal cause. Under the legal cause test, "a 
claimant with a preexisting condition must 
show that the employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk 
he already faced in everyday life because 
of his condition." 729 P.2d at 25. When a 
claimant has no preexisting risk factors, 
any exertion connected with the employ-
ment and causally connected with the inju-
ry as a matter of medical fact will satisfy 
the legal causation test. 729 P.2d at 26. 
In addition to proving legal causation, 
the claimant must also prove medical cau-
sation. "Under the medical cause test, the 
claimant must show . . . that the stress, 
strain or exertion required by his or her 
occupation led to the resulting injury or 
disability." 729 P.2d at 27. 
In this case, the administrative law judge 
did not distinguish in his causation analysis 
between legal and medical causation. 
However, it is clear from the medical testi-
mony and other evidence presented to the 
administrative law judge that his decision 
was based on the failure to prove medical 
causation. Because the result in this case 
turns on the issue of medical causation, we 
will not examine the issue of legal causa-
tion. 
[2] The claimant argues that his work 
activities in cold weather and at a high 
altitude precipitated the myocardial infarc-
tion. The medical evidence before the ad-
ministrative law judge was less chan con-
clusive. The claimant's phyn:ian, Dr. 
Chanderraj, was the doctor most certain 
that the working conditions at Brian Head 
contributed to the injury. His opinion, 
however, was not unequivocal. He stated 
that the altitude, cold, and working condi-
tions "probably" precipitated the heart at-
tack. Dr. Chanderraj answered questions 
by the claimant's counsel as follows: 
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Q. Let me ask you, Doctor, during all 
of the time that Mr. Lancaster has been 
your patient, have you had an opportuni-
ty to form an opinion as to whether or 
not the elevation, the cold, and the work-
ing conditions at the time of Mr. Lancas-
ter's myocardial infarction precipitated 
that heart attack? 
A. This is a very difficult question to 
answer because it's a gray area in the 
field of cardiology; the exact role of 
precipitating factors in producing the 
event, but it is well known that high 
altitude, where the oxygen content of the 
air is low, especially in cold weather, can 
induce a myocardial event 
Q. Would it be your opinion that the 
cold, exposure, and the altitude, and the 
work conditions played a significant role 
or would be the trigger or the lighting up 
process of the myocardial infarction? 
A. I think we did go over this. I do 
feel it triggered—let me put it another 
way. If he had not been working up on 
that particular day in the cold atmc 
sphere, operating the heavy equipment, 
in spite of having—in spite of five days 
history of chest pain, he probably would 
not have sustained a myocardial infarc-
tion. 
Dr. Perry, the chairman of the medical 
panel and a cardiologist, testified it was 
"likely" that the conditions under which 
Mr. Lancaster was working aggravated his 
preexisting heart condition. However, Dr. 
Perry also was less than certain about the 
causal connection between the work condi-
tions and the myocardial infarction. In his 
report to the administrative law judge, Dr. 
Perry identified and ranked the role of 
various risk factors, incJdding those associ-
ated with work, in precipitating the claim-
ant's myocardial infarction. He stated in 
his report: 
Mr. Lancaster has mild diabetes mellitus, 
smokes cigarettes, has an elevated uric 
acid and an elevated serum cholesterol 
level, all of which increase risk of coro-
nary artery disease. In very rough 
terms the cigarette smoking, diabetes 
and high cholesterol approximately each 
double the risk of coronary artery dis-
ease such that with these three plus the 
uric acid elevation, his risk for coronary 
artery disease is 8-10 times higher than 
another male of his same age. From 
informal jn gleaned from the records, 
summary of testimony and talking to Mr. 
Lancaster himself, I did not view his 
y/ork as a risk factor for a myocardial 
infarction. While it was apparently cold, 
he was not involved in any unusual exer-
tion, neither was he subjected to any 
unusual stress. 
. . . While it is possible the cold expo-
sure and his exertion had a role in precip-
itating the myocardial infarction, it is my 
opinion that is is unlikely they played a 
significant role. His 5 days of unstable 
angina lead me to believe that the patient 
was about to have a myocardial infarc-
tion, and the rather moderate amount of 
exertion and the length of time spent 
working simply offered an appropriate 
time and place for this event. 
Y\U»en asked to quantify the contribution 
of preexisting ris^ factors and work 
factors to the claim^u s myocardial infarc-
tion, Dr. Perry assigned a value of 90 per-
cent to preexisting conditions and 10 per-
cent to work conditions. Dr. Perry ex-
plained, however, that his assessment of 
the factors was "a fairly random guess." 
In addition, the State Insurance Fund 
had its doctor, Frank Dituri, review the 
claimant's medical records. Dr. Dituri 
opined that there was no evidence to indi-
cate that the claimant's myocardial infarc-
tion was caused by his work or the altitude 
and cold at his place of work. Dr. Dituri 
concluded, "The type of work activities de-
scribed could not precipitate any acute 
myocardial infarction." According to Dr. 
Dituri, the claimant's injury was "due to 
the normal progression of arteriosclerotic 
cororary artery disease that had been 
presciit for several years and was due to 
such factors as his smoking, his hypercho-
lesterolemia, his poorly controlled diabetes 
and his prior history of alcohol abuse." 
Thus, although there may have been 
some connection between the heart attack 
and the cold weather and high altitude, the 
evidence of any such connection is inconclu-
sive. Not one of the doctors was willing to 
state with medical certainty that the claim-
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ant's injury was caused by work-related 
factors. Thus, there is competent and com-
prehensive medical evidence in the record 
upon which the administrative law judge 
could rely in concluding that medical causa-
tion was lacking. Although the medical 
evidence was conflicting, it is the responsi-
bility of the administrative law judge to 
resolve factual conflicts. 
We hold that the Industrial Commission's 
conclusion that there was no medical causal 
connection between work conditions and 
the claimant's heart attack is neither "arbi-
trary or capricious" nor "without any sub-
stantial evidence to support it." We there-
fore affirm the order of the Industrial 
Commission. 
HALL, C.J., and HOWE and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, Associate C.J., concurs in 
the result. 
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statutory authority or rule which properly 
conferred jurisdiction upon appellate court, 
as well as other information, will result in 
dismissal of appeal, particularly when coun-
sel ignores appellate court's request that 
statement be properly amended. Rules 
App.Proc, Rule 9(e). 
2. Appeal and Error <S=>784 
Appeal required dismissal where coun-
sel filed docketing statement which failed 
to comply with requirement that statement 
set forth any statutory authority or rule 
which properly conferred jurisdiction upon 
appellate court. Rules App.Proc, Rules 9, 
9(d). 
LaMar Duncan, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff. 
Linda Wheat Field, Attorney, Dept. of 
Employment Sec, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and 
DAVIDSON, 
Craig BROOKS, Plaintiff, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SE-
CURITY, Board of Review of the Indus-
trial Commission of Utah, Defendants. 
No. 860284-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 24, 1987. 
After completion of litigation, counsel 
for plaintiff prutioned for writ of review. 
The Court of appeals held that appeal re-
quired dismissal based upon counsel's filing 
of docketing statement which did not con-
ply with rule requiring statements to set 
forth statutory authority or rule which 
properly conferred jurisdiction upon appel-
late court. 
Dismissed. 
1. Appeal and Error <§=>784 
Failure of docketing statements to ful-
ly comply with rule requiring citation of 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
PER CURIAM: 
[1,2] In the above case, plaintiffs coun-
sel filed with this Court a "docketing state-
ment" that does not comply with Rule 9 of 
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The statement filed fails to set forth any 
statutory authority or rule which properly 
confers jurisdiction upon this Court. Other 
information required by Rule 9 is also lack-
ing and necessary documents are not at-
tached. R. Utah CtApp. 9(d). 
Docketing statements must fully comply 
with Rule 9. Failure to comply will result 
in dismissal of the appeal, particularly 
when counsel ignores our request that the 
statement be properly amended. Gregory 
v. Fourthwest Investments Ltd., 735 P.2d 
33 (Utah 1987); R. Utah Ct.App. 9(e). 
The appeal is dismissed. 
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